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Abstract 
 
 In my Senior Thesis, I explore the growth of socially responsible investing (SRI) 
practices in U.S. equity markets and abnormal sin stocks returns. I analyze the historical 
performance of socially responsible ETFs and portfolios of current sin stocks—alcohol, tobacco, 
gaming, and aerospace & defense stocks. I propose that as socially responsible investing practices 
continue to grow in U.S. equity markets, more industries will eventually be deemed sinful—such 
as sugary beverages, fast food/sugary food, biotech & pharmaceuticals, and tech/social media. I 
examine two sinful industries—alcohol and tobacco—by comparing the performance of these 
sinful portfolios before and after their industries were widely perceived as sinful. 
 I explored these topics for a few key reasons. First, socially responsible investing 
practices in U.S. equity markets have exploded in popularity over the last decade. Every year, we 
see increasing amounts of money screened for environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
factors. Despite its increase in popularity, many people have claimed that socially responsible 
investing isn’t financially responsible investing—it underperforms as compared to common 
benchmarks such as the S&P 500. On the other hand, existing literature has supported the claim 
that investing in sin stocks generates abnormal returns for investors. I hypothesize that these two 
areas of portfolio management are connected—as socially responsible investing practices 
continue to grow, more industries will eventually be widely perceived as sinful. If the sin stock 
anomaly does exist and portfolios of sin stocks do generate abnormal returns, individuals and 
institutions can benefit from an immediate and long term investment strategy by investing in 
these “future” sinful industries now.  
 Using three distinct capital asset pricing models—the Fama-French 3 Factor Model, the 
Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum, and the Fama-French 5 Factor Model—I come to 
four main conclusions. First, investing in socially responsible ETFs does not generate positive 
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abnormal returns; in some instances, it generates statistically significant negative abnormal 
returns. Second, across the Fama-French 3 Factor Model, the Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus 
Momentum, and the Fama-French 5 Factor Model, portfolios of sin stocks from 1977-2018 
generate statistically significant positive abnormal returns. Third, during the same time horizon, 
portfolios of future sin stocks exhibit similar levels of abnormal returns, especially portfolios of 
biotech & pharmaceutical stocks and portfolios of tech/social media stocks. Finally, portfolios of 
alcohol and tobacco stocks generated statistically significant abnormal returns after being widely 
perceived as sinful as compared to before they were widely perceived as sinful.  
 My research has implications for practicing portfolio managers. First, socially responsible 
investing isn’t financially responsible investing. Second, portfolio managers should consider how 
the growth of socially responsible investing practices will impact perceptions of what is sinful. 
Anticipating which industries will become sinful can yield a profitable investment strategy. Third, 
I promote a profitable investment strategy in the short- and long-term time horizon. The results 
are clear: go long on sin and short on SRI.  
Key Words: Sin, ESG, ETF, VICEX, Fama-French, Tobacco 
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1. Introduction 
The growth of socially responsible investing (SRI) practices in U.S. equity markets 
focuses on screening potential investment choices for environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) factors. Some of these factors include the percentage of women in the 
C-suite, how diverse and inclusive a company is, or the amount of carbon emissions 
produced by the company on an annual basis. At its core, SRI focuses on screening 
investment choices for morally and ethically sound factors. On the other end of the moral 
and ethical spectrum are sin stocks. Sin stocks are stocks of companies that produce or 
provide a good or service that is deemed morally problematic by investors. The most 
common kind of sin stocks are the “triumvirate of sin,” which include alcohol, tobacco, 
and gaming stocks. Similarly, aerospace & defense stocks have been grouped in with the 
“triumvirate of sin” as a key sinful industry. This has been due to the increasing tension 
in the U.S. over the right to bear arms and the U.S.’s usage of advanced military 
technology, such as drones. These two areas of portfolio management couldn’t be more 
different; the growth of SRI in U.S. equity markets focuses on screening potential 
investments for moral and ethical traits while sin stocks exhibit immoral and unethical 
traits.  
These two topics question basic portfolio management theory. Most portfolio 
management theories assume that the investor wants to maximize their own utility. As we 
learned in our portfolio management class last spring, the investor must make two 
decisions—how much to invest in a risk-free vs. a risky portfolio and how much to invest 
in each type of risky asset in the risky portfolio. The mean-variance utility model states 
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that the utility of the investor is equal to the expected return on the portfolio minus one-
half risk aversion parameter times the variance of the portfolio return. In this basic 
portfolio management-utility model, we consider the expected return of the portfolio, the 
variance of its return and the risk characteristics of the investor. This well-known and 
widely accepted model is challenged by SRI practices and sin stocks. SRI practices 
consider two things in portfolio construction; the mean-variance utility model and the 
moral and ethical convictions in portfolio construction. This truth raises a series of 
question about SRI practices. First, why should investors include their moral and ethical 
convictions in portfolio construction? Similarly, if investors do include their convictions 
in their utility model, how is investment performance affected? These challenges and 
questions are brought to investing in sin stocks as well. The mean-variance utility model 
includes nothing about moral and ethical convictions, but, should investors invest in 
companies that produce/provide a good/service that is deemed sinful? If so, how is 
investment performance affected?  
According to the USSIF (The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible 
Investment), SRI practices in the U.S. are growing at a rapidly. In 2016, one of out every 
five dollars under professional management in the U.S. was screened for basic ESG 
factors—amounting to nearly $8.72 trillion. Similarly, in the last decade, sustainable 
investing has grown in a positive direction, excluding the financial crisis of 2008-2009.1 
This growth is exhibited in Figure 1. As institutions and investors have become more 
socially responsible in their investment choices, more industries have been perceived as 
                                                           
1 “Report on U.S. Sustainable, Responsible, and Impact Investing Trends 2016,” The Forum for Sustainable 
and Responsible Investing, accessed November 29, 2018, 
https://www.ussif.org/files/SIF_Trends_16_Executive_Summary(1).pdf. 
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sinful. The “triumvirate of sin” has grown from alcohol stocks, tobacco stocks, and 
gaming stocks to include aerospace & defense stocks, cannabis stocks and pornography 
stocks.  
Even though SRI practices in U.S. equity markets have exploded in popularity 
over the past decade, there is an overwhelming amount of evidence that SRI 
underperforms common benchmarks, such as the S&P 500. For example, the S&P 500 
has returned 9.4% over the past decade. In May 2018, the Wall Street Journal reported 
that eight representative ESG ETFs had a lower 10 year annualized total return than the 
SPDR S&P 500 ETF, and some ESG focused ETFs even had negative 10-year annualized 
returns.2  
In contrast, portfolios of sin stocks have historically outperformed these common 
benchmarks. Most notably, Fabozzi, Ma, and Oliphant (2008) find that a sin stock 
anomaly exists and that portfolios of sin stocks generate positive alpha. In a key follow 
up analysis, Fabozzi and Blitz (2017) find that portfolios of sin stocks see lower levels of 
alpha in a Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum. As they add in different Fama-
French factors, including profitability and investment, they find that the sin stock 
anomaly doesn’t exist—implying these positive abnormal returns disappear. 
 This thesis contributes to the existing literature in four ways. First, I test the sin 
stock anomaly. In order to do this, I use regression models and Fama-French Factor 
Models. I created my portfolios of current sin stocks—alcohol, tobacco, gaming and 
aerospace & defense—by using Standard Industrialized Codes (SICs). These SICs are 
                                                           
2 Dan Weil, “Do-Good Funds Finally Are Paying Off in Performance. Will It Last?” New York Times, May 
2018. 
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used to denote different industry groupings; they automatically create portfolios of stocks 
based industries. In this part of my paper, I want to see the levels of alpha generated once 
these portfolios are regressed on the Fama-French factors. I also test the existence of a 
negative relationship between the level of alpha generated and the introduction of more 
Fama-French factors in my regression models. Prior academic papers tested the sin stock 
anomaly in different ways than me—such as creating portfolios of sinful industries by 
handpicking stocks. My robust portfolio construction using SIC codes provides a new 
way to test the existence of the sin stock anomaly. 
Second, I assess whether socially responsible investing practices generate 
abnormal returns. In order to do this, I use regression models and Fama-French Factor 
Models. I compiled a list of socially responsible ETFs by isolating funds with an ESG 
focus. I aim to see the levels of alpha (if any) generated once they are regressed on the 
Fama-French factors and I want to see the levels of statistical significance associated with 
the levels of alpha generated. Furthermore, I aim to see if there is any kind of statistical 
performance that is driving the influx of money being screened for ESG factors. 
Third, I examine portfolios of what I believe to be “future” sin stocks to see if they 
have generated positive alpha in the past. In order to do this, I use regression models and 
Fama-French Factor Models. I created my portfolios of “future” sin stocks in the same 
manner that I used to create portfolios of my current sin stocks—picking SIC codes that 
are most representative of the industry as a whole. In this part of my paper, I want to see 
if portfolios of “future” sin stocks generated alpha (if any) once regressed on the Fama-
French factors. I am curious to see if these portfolios have generated alpha in the past. 
More importantly, if these portfolios have generated alpha in the past, I conjecture that 
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these portfolios have the potential to generate larger levels of alpha going forward once 
their industries are widely perceived as sinful by institutions and investors. 
Fourth, I aim to address the hypothesis I develop in the third part of my paper—could 
portfolios of “future” sin stocks generate higher levels of alpha in the future once those 
industries are widely perceived as sinful by institutions and investors? While I cannot 
calculate future stock returns, nor can I say that these industries will become sinful, I can 
analyze the returns of portfolios of current sin stocks before and after an increase in the 
perceived sinfulness of the two industries. The most straightforward case studies involve 
looking at the tobacco industry and the alcohol industry in the U.S. The U.S. government 
put out damning information and passed crucial legislation showing the adverse health 
effects associated with alcohol and tobacco usage. I am curious to see if portfolios of 
tobacco stocks and alcohol stocks generated higher levels of alpha after they were 
perceived as sinful as compared to before they were perceived as sinful. If those 
portfolios do generate larger abnormal returns after their industries were perceived as 
sinful, it bolsters my argument and could highlight a significant investment strategy for 
the short-term and long-term time horizons. I hypothesize that my case studies will reveal 
that portfolios of alcohol and tobacco stocks after they were widely perceived as sinful 
will outperform portfolios of alcohol and tobacco stocks before they were widely 
perceived as sinful; this outperformance is the most crucial piece of evidence proving the 
existence of the sin stock anomaly. 
This Thesis reaches four conclusions. First, socially responsible investing isn’t 
financially responsible investing; socially responsible investing overall doesn’t deliver 
positive abnormal returns and factoring your moral and ethical convictions in your 
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portfolio construction undermines your portfolio’s performance. Second, in my sample 
from 1977 through 2018, my portfolios of current sin stocks generated positive and 
statistically significant levels of alpha across a series of factor models. Third, my 
portfolios of future sin stocks generated positive, and statistically significant levels of 
alpha across all factor models. My portfolios of biotech & pharmaceuticals stocks and 
tech/social stocks generated positive, and statistically significant levels of alpha across all 
factor models. My portfolios of sugary beverages stocks and fast food/sugary food 
generated positive, and statistically significant levels of alpha across all factor models 
(except the Fama-French 5 Factor Model). Fourth, I compared the performance of 
portfolios of alcohol and tobacco stocks before and after those industries were widely 
viewed as sinful. Portfolios of alcohol and tobacco stocks before they were widely 
perceived as sinful failed to generate positive and statistically significant levels of alpha. 
On the other hand, portfolios of alcohol and tobacco stocks after those industries were 
widely perceived as sinful generated positive, and statistically significant levels of alpha. 
These results help bolster the existence of the sin stock anomaly in U.S. equity markets. 
More importantly, these results reinforce the notion that once industries are widely 
perceived as sinful by institutions and investors, portfolios of these stocks generate 
positive, larger, and statistically significant levels of alpha as compared to portfolios of 
these stocks before they were widely perceived as sinful by institutions and individuals. 
This finding is crucial in bolstering my argument that as socially responsible investing 
continues to grow, more industries will be perceived as sinful and portfolios of those 
stocks will generate larger levels of excess returns than before they were perceived as 
sinful.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
a. Sin Stock Literature Review 
 
While the sin stock anomaly wasn’t documented until the mid-2000s, theoretical 
foundations for the anomaly were provided much earlier. Becker (1957) claims that 
investors shouldn’t factor in cultural norms into their mean-variance utility model. He 
argues that if investors discriminate against potential investment choices by incorporating 
social norms, they bear a financial cost in doing so. While Becker (1957) doesn’t provide 
any data relating to SRI or sin stock performance, his model helps explain why SRI 
approaches could result in losing out on potential financial gains. 
Similarly, Merton (1987) proposes a series of hypotheses and models that can be 
directly tied to sin stock performance. In his paper, he discusses the significance of 
neglected stocks and creates a model of market segmentation. According to Merton, 
neglected stocks are unpopular stocks. He claims that neglected stocks are not as heavily 
followed by professional analysts as other stocks. Consequently, the price of neglected 
stocks is always further from their true intrinsic value, creating significant price 
differentials. Essentially, neglected stocks are more valuable due to their lack of 
coverage. Furthermore, Merton (1987) proposes a model of market segmentation. He 
claims that there is an investable universe encompassing all publicly traded stocks. In his 
model, an investor will construct a portfolio with a given security, only if the investor 
knows about that given security. He bolsters his argument by claiming that there are 
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thousands of tradeable securities and that most portfolios contain only a fraction of them. 
If investors do not know about a security, they cannot add that security to their portfolio. 
The first paper, and most significant paper, to analyze sin stock performance is 
Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant (2008). They construct a portfolio of sin stocks. Their portfolio 
includes selected alcohol stocks, tobacco stocks, gaming stocks, defense stocks, adult 
services stocks and biotech stocks. They choose firms based on specific revenue 
breakdowns and product line offerings. They examine monthly stock returns from 1970-
2007. Their portfolio of sin stocks generates an annual return of 19 percent. The alpha 
generated from their sinful portfolio outperforms their common benchmarks. Along with 
this finding, they highlight how their sinful portfolio had fewer years of generating a 
negative return as compared to their market benchmarks. The sinful portfolio produced 
negative returns in two years of the thirty-seven-year time horizon. On the other hand, 
their market benchmarks generated negative returns in nine of the thirty-seven-year time 
horizon.  
The second most significant paper to explore the sin stock anomaly was written by 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). Their paper was different than Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant 
(2008) because they proposed a trading strategy revolving around sin stocks. Using 
Fama-French industry groups, Hong and Kacperczyk execute their trading strategy—they 
take a long position on portfolios of sin stocks and they take a short position on portfolios 
of comparable stocks (stocks from Fama-French industry groups of food, fun, etc.) Using 
monthly stock returns over a forty-year time horizon, they found that their trading 
strategy generated 26 basis points per month when regressed on the Fama-French 3 
Factor Model including the Momentum factor. They also analyze sin stock performance 
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in their study and find that sin stocks outperform their comparables by 29 basis points a 
month.  
Adamsson and Hoepner (2015) re-examine the sin stock anomaly. Both authors are 
concerned with the main criticism that Hong and Kacperczyk’s paper received—can 
abnormal returns be generated for the average investor by investing in sin stocks? In their 
study, they create equal-weighted sin portfolios and find that they generate alpha—like 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). However, they questioned the “ivory tower” data models 
that Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) created. Adamsson and Hoepner (2015) claim that 
equal-weighted portfolios of sinful industries are not easily investable for many 
institutional investors that have value-weighted benchmarks. Similarly, they believe 
equal-weighted portfolios were exposed to a small cap bias. They argue that if small cap 
firms outperform large cap firms, then an equal-weighted portfolio is likely to outperform 
its value-weighted equivalent. Once they create value-weighted portfolios of sin stocks, 
they find that these portfolios do not generate any abnormal returns—implying that the 
sin stock anomaly doesn’t exist.  
Richey (2016) generates portfolios of sinful industries by compiling daily stock 
returns from a twenty-nine year time horizon (October 1987-October 2016). He also 
creates one sinful portfolio that incorporates all of his defined sinful industries. He then 
uses a series of regression models—Jensen’s Alpha, Fama-French 3 Factor Model, 
Carhart 4 Factor Model—also known as the Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus 
Momentum—and the Fama-French 5 Factor Model—to get a series of compelling results. 
In his study, he found that his sin portfolios exhibited a positive and significant alpha 
when regressed on the following models: Jensen’s Alpha, Fama-French 3 Factor Model 
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and Carhart 4 Factor Model. On the other hand, when he regresses his sin portfolios on 
the Fama-French 5 Factor model, their levels of alpha decrease. 
Blitz and Fabozzi (2017) revisit the most significant sin stock paper written—
Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant (2008). Over a decade later, the two men wanted to revisit the 
topic and apply new data models. They created a value weighted portfolio of alcohol, 
tobacco and weapons stocks by gathering monthly return data from Fama-French 
industry sectors of “beer,” “smoke,” and “guns.” They collect monthly stock returns from 
July 1963-December 2016. Using time-series regression models, Blitz and Fabozzi 
(2017) establish the sin stock anomaly does exist when their portfolio was regressed on 
the classic size, value, and momentum factors. However, when they include the new 
Fama-French factors of profitability and investment in their time-series regression model, 
virtually no alpha is generated, signifying that the sin stock anomaly is explained by the 
portfolio’s exposure to the most recent Fama-French factors.  
All of these papers provide an interesting backdrop on the sin stock anomaly. Until 
2015, numerous academic papers were published that confirmed the existence of it. 
However, in the past couple of years, numerous academic studies disprove the sin stock 
anomaly. They claim that by updating the Fama-French Factor Models to incorporate 
more variables, the sin stock anomaly disappears. Effectively, numerous academics have 
argued that the sin stock anomaly can be explained by these stocks exposure to more 
factors in capital asset pricing models.  
 
 
 
17 | L o r i  
 
b. Socially Responsible Investing Literature Review 
 
Most academic papers cite the same author that was heavily cited to explain the 
sin stock anomaly: Thomas Merton (1987). Most academics who cite Thomas Merton 
refer to his ideas concerning neglected stocks and market segmentation. First, Merton 
(1987) suggests that stocks that have less institutional and individual following tend to be 
undervalued. Second, Merton (1987) claims in his model of market segmentation that you 
can only construct a portfolio of securities you know about. Unlike sin stocks, Merton’s 
(1987) concepts adversely affect socially responsible investing practices. Because 
socially responsible investing practices with an ESG focus have exploded in popularity in 
U.S. equity markets, both institutions and individuals tend to be proactive with their 
investment choices, screening out investment choices that go against their moral and 
ethical beliefs. Consequently, socially responsible securities tend to be followed more 
than sin stocks—creating less potential true value for both institutions and investors. 
Similarly, Merton’s (1987) model of market segmentation adversely affects socially 
responsible investing. As mentioned before, socially responsible investing practices have 
grown in popularity in U.S. equity markets and investing in sin stocks has become 
increasingly taboo in U.S. equity markets. People who screen their investment choices for 
ESG traits tend to have a smaller realm of investable securities. This focus on ESG traits 
is now becoming the norm. Effectively, the pool of socially responsible securities 
continues to get smaller with more investors following suit. On the other hand, the pool 
of sin stocks continues to get larger with fewer investors following suit because investing 
in morally hazardous companies has become increasingly taboo.  
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While socially responsible investing practices have exploded in popularity over 
the past two decades, it is interesting to note that its origins trace back to the 1960s and 
1970s. In a research piece published by Blaine Townsend (2017) of Bailard Wealth 
Management, he analyzes the history of SRI practices and ESG focused investment 
strategies. Townsend (2017) notes that the 1960s were one of the most dynamic times in 
American history, where contemporary societal values were challenged aggressively. 
Issues regarding social justice, climate change, women’s rights, and corporate 
governance became hot-button issues. Consequently, this led to the creation of the first 
mutual funds reflecting these sentiments in the 1970s. Similar to socially responsible 
investors today, investors in the 1970s felt compelled by principal and not by quantitative 
results—they believed that certain investments went against their core principals. 
Townsend (2017) argues that the biggest catalyst of SRI practices was the Vietnam War. 
As the war progressed, the U.S. population grew increasingly doubtful of our place in it 
and the U.S. population increasingly wanted to get out of it. Many contemporary 
investors understood that certain investment strategies would profit off war efforts and 
these investors avoided certain investment strategies.  
Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993) study the investment performance of socially 
responsible mutual funds. In their paper, they pose two questions. The first, “what are the 
alternative hypotheses about the expected relative returns of socially responsible mutual 
funds and conventional mutual funds?” The second, “what are the actual relative returns 
of socially responsible mutual funds and conventional mutual funds?”(Pg. 63) Similarly, 
they pose three alternative hypotheses about the relative return of socially responsible 
portfolios and their conventional counterparts. First, they hypothesize that the risk-
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adjusted expected returns of a socially responsible portfolio equals the risk-adjusted 
expected returns of a conventional portfolio. This idea comes from the belief that stocks 
do not feature a price differential if they are socially responsible or not—for every 
socially responsible investor there is a conventional investor who doesn’t care about 
socially responsible investing practices. Second, they hypothesize that the expected 
returns of a socially responsible portfolio will be less than the expected returns of a 
conventional portfolio. This idea comes from the belief that socially responsible investors 
impact stock prices, implying the market negatively prices the socially responsible 
characteristic. Third, they hypothesize that the expected returns of socially responsible 
portfolios will be greater than the expected returns of a conventional portfolio. This idea 
comes from the belief that investors who screen their investment choices for socially 
responsible traits will do better than the conventional investor who doesn’t factor these 
traits at all. Using a series of regression models, the authors come to two conclusions. 
First, socially responsible mutual funds do not generate statistically significant levels of 
abnormal return. Second, the performance of socially responsible mutual funds is eerily 
comparable to the performance of conventional mutual funds. Essentially, the authors 
find that negative screening doesn’t impact fund performance. 
Steve Schueth (2003) provides more detail on the topic by highlighting the 
investor motivations and strategies used by socially responsible investors. Schueth (2003) 
argues that socially responsible investors are motivated to put their money into 
investments that align with their personal values and they are motivated to put their 
money into investments that help improve the livelihood of others. Similarly, he posits 
that investors have three strategies to achieve a desired financial return while abiding to 
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their own moral compass. First, he argues that screening—including or excluding 
companies from your portfolio based on some kind of social or environmental criteria—is 
an effective way for the socially responsible investor to achieve his/her portfolio goals. 
Second, he suggests that shareholder advocacy—actions that investors take in their role 
of as owners of corporate America—is a very effective way for the socially responsible 
investor to achieve his/her portfolio goals. These efforts are aimed at improving the social 
and environmental responsibilities of corporations. Third, he claims that community 
investing—providing capital to individuals who cannot routinely access funds—is an 
effective way of achieving his/her portfolio goals. He states that many socially 
responsible investors give a small percentage of their investment to Community 
Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs). These CDFIs then give that money to small 
business owners who cannot easily access capital through a more traditional route, like 
receiving a loan from a bank. 
 
Derwall, Guenster, Bauer, and Koedijk (2005) analyzed the performance of 
socially responsible portfolios. Like Hamilton, Jo, and Statman (1993), these authors 
wanted to see if socially responsible portfolios outperform conventional portfolios. 
Unlike other studies in the past that use screens to determine what is socially responsible 
and what is not, the authors use a new metric—eco efficiency. Derwall, Guenster, Bauer 
and Koedijk (2005) define eco-efficiency as the “ratio of the value that the company adds 
to the waste the company generates by creating that value.” (Pg. 53) They constructed 
two portfolios based on eco-efficient rated-data—an eco-efficient portfolio and an eco-
inefficient portfolio. From the time period of 1995-2003, they found that the eco-efficient 
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portfolio generated larger positive abnormal returns than the eco-inefficient portfolio. By 
using regression models to analyze their data, they found that the difference in the two 
portfolios’ performance could not be explained by differences in, “market sensitivity, 
investment style or industry-specific factors.” Effectively, the authors found that an 
investor who factors ESG traits in their portfolio construction can benefit more than an 
investor who does not. 
Galema, Plantiga, and Scholten (2008) analyze the relationship between socially 
responsible investing practices and expected returns. They cite Merton’s (1987) paper 
and argue that price differentials would exist if the demand was different for different 
kinds of stocks—including incomplete information. They claim that the increased 
demand for socially responsible stocks will cause stocks to be overpriced. Interestingly 
enough, this paper is one of the few that I found that discusses how Merton’s (1987) 
model would affect these kind of stocks and how it would affect sin stocks. They claim 
that “irresponsible” firm’s stocks would not be as popular as socially responsible firm’s 
stocks and that would lead to an underpricing, and ultimately lead to a return premium. In 
their article, they analyze monthly stock returns from years 1992-2006 and they set up 12 
distinct portfolios—reflecting the socially responsible scores they used to organize their 
data. They find two things. First, they find that the aggregate analysis of SRI scores does 
not eliminate a relationship if individual dimensions of SRI have opposite effects on 
performance. Similarly, they find that SRI impacts stock returns by lowering the book-to-
market ratio and not by generating abnormal returns.  
Dan Weil (2018) published an article in the Wall Street Journal that discusses 
how socially responsible ETFs in the most recent fiscal year have performed. Using data 
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from ETF.com, Weil (2018) points out that 26 out of 47 socially responsible ETFs 
(approximately 55%) outperformed the broad market—using the SPDR S&P 500 ETF—
since March 31, 2017. He claims that this outperformance is caused by an updated 
screening approach used by fund managers. Instead of eliminating stocks with negative 
ESG traits or because certain kind of stocks were from immoral industries, these fund 
managers now research stocks with positive ESG scores and construct ETFs with the 
highest performing stocks. While he notes that this is a significant development for 
socially responsible investing, he argues that investors should be cautious. Over a ten-
year time horizon, he finds that eight of the forty-seven funds have been around since the 
late 2000s. Furthermore, he claims that out of these eight funds, each of which is 
screened for ESG traits, none of them outperformed the SPDR ETF over the last 
decade—which has a 10-year annualized return of 9.4%. In addition, four of the eight 
socially responsible ETFs have negative 10-year annualized returns. While Weil 
questions the sustainability of the excess returns generated by socially responsible ETFs, 
he validates two claims—over the past decade, socially responsible ETFs have gained 
immense popularity among investors, but, they have underperformed as compared to 
common benchmarks.  
 
c. Future of Sin Stocks Literature Review 
 
I could not find any academic papers that discussed the possibility, or the indication, 
of future industries that will perceived as sinful by investors one day. While this may be 
the case, I hypothesize that one day, the following industries will be perceived as sinful 
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by both individuals and institutions—fast food/sugary foods, sugary beverages, biotech & 
pharmaceutical and technology/social media. Even though there have been no academic 
papers discussing the possibility of these industries being viewed as sinful, there has been 
a tremendous amount of research done and a plethora of articles published that highlight 
the immoral/unethical traits of these industries. I believe that these articles published by 
major news outlets are the stepping-stone for more academic research to be done on the 
topic. 
The fast food industry in the U.S. is incredibly profitable. According to Statista, the 
fast food industry is projected to generate $214.8B in revenue in 2018.3 Major players in 
the industry include McDonald’s, Yum! Brands, and Chipotle. Despite the financial 
success of these food chains, they have received numerous negative headlines over the 
years. The fast food industry has been claimed to be at the core of both the type-two 
diabetes epidemic and the obesity epidemic in the U.S. Mello, Rimm and Studdert (2003) 
analyze one of the most prominent lawsuits against the fast food industry. In 2002, a 
group of adolescents from New York City sued the McDonald’s Corporation and argued 
that the McDonald’s food they consumed caused them negative health side-effects—
including obesity, type-two diabetes, etc. These children claimed that McDonald’s used 
misleading advertising, produced grossly unsafe food, and failed to warn its consumers 
about the adverse side effects that come from its consumption. While McDonald’s won 
the case, this conflict stirred up a tremendous amount of negative press about the fast 
                                                           
3 “Leading quick service restaurant (QSR) chains in the United States in 2017, by sales per unit (in million   
U.S. dollars)”, Statista, accessed November 23, 2018, https://www.statista.com/statistics/242870/average-
sales-per-system-unit-of-quick-service-restaurant-chains/. 
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food industry and it caused discussion about the adverse health effects associated with 
eating fast food. Interestingly enough, the article references a current sinful industry 
extensively—the tobacco industry. The tobacco industry is plagued with similar kinds of 
lawsuits regarding the role of the industry in promoting unhealthy lifestyle choices. 
Arguably, the most significant source of information regarding the adverse health effects 
associated with eating fast food is Morgan Spurlock’s documentary, Super-Size Me. In 
his critically acclaimed documentary, Spurlock eats McDonald’s three times a day for a 
month. Throughout the course of the month, his weight dramatically increases, his energy 
levels fall, and he is affected by a whole host of negative side-effects.4 His documentary 
was the breakthrough piece that solidified two things; the adverse health effects of eating 
fast food and the role of the fast food industry in the U.S.’s type-two diabetes and obesity 
epidemic.  I believe that as investors in U.S. equity markets become more socially 
responsible, they will eventually perceive the fast food industry, and the sugary food 
industry, sinful. 
The beverage industry is eerily similar to the fast food industry—they both are 
incredibly profitable, they both rake in billions of dollars in annual revenue, and they 
both contribute to the type two diabetes and obesity epidemic in the U.S. Major players in 
the industry, such as the Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, are known to include all kinds of 
unhealthy ingredients in their products—including sugar and aspartame, both of which 
have been linked a plethora of adverse health effects. A study by Harvard’s School of 
Public Health, revealed a series of alarming findings related to the impact sugary 
beverages have on Americans. They found that people who regularly drink sugary 
                                                           
4 Morgan Spurlock, Super Size Me (2004; Samuel Goldwyn Films, 2004), Film. 
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beverages (1-2 cans or more a day) have a 26% greater risk of developing type two 
diabetes than those who don’t. In another study, more than 40,000 men were followed 
around for two decades. In their study, they found that those individuals who had just one 
can of soda per day had a 20% higher risk of having a heart attack or dying from a heart 
attack than men who didn’t drink soda.5 Eventually, I believe investors in U.S. equity 
markets will widely perceive the sugary beverage industry sinful. Much like the fast food 
industry, extensive studies list the adverse health effects that arise from consuming their 
products.  
Unlike the fast food and sugary beverage industries, biotech & pharmaceutical 
industries do not contribute to the obesity epidemic in the USA. The biotech industry has 
the potential to be widely perceived as sinful by investors going forward due to the rapid 
development of groundbreaking sciences. In an article titled Thinking Ethically About 
Human Biotechnology, Margaret R. McLean, Ph.D., (2000) discusses the development of 
biotechnology and the concern that has developed over the growth of the field. She states 
that modern biotechnology has one goal—to increase human health and lifespans. She 
argues that while these developments are fascinating, many people are becoming 
concerned with the field’s development; these people believe that the developments that 
come out of this industry have led to belief that humans are getting too much power over 
their evolution and destiny. She states, 
Since the birth of Dolly the cloned sheep, public concern about advancing 
biotechnology has been enflamed by the suspicion that science is at the mercy of the 
                                                           
5 “Soft Drinks and Disease,” Harvard School of Public Health, accessed November 18th, 2018, 
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/healthy-drinks/soft-drinks-and-disease/. 
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technological imperative, the propensity to think that because something can be done, 
it is inevitable. This seemingly easy slide from can to will—because it is technically 
possible to clone a child into existence, it will become an everyday occurrence, for 
example—leaves some with a sense of fatedness, a sense that science is unstoppable. 
Hence, for those people, science is not a subject of ethical concern.  
The development of the biotech industry has done amazing things for the growth of 
advanced sciences. However, like McLean (2000) points out, many people are concerned 
that these developments create ethical dilemmas where science essentially plays the role 
of God. With the continuous developments of the biotech industry, I believe that 
eventually these developments will scare people enough and this industry will be 
perceived as sinful. 
On the other hand, I believe that the pharmaceuticals industry will not be 
eventually be perceived as sinful due to their developments; it will be perceived as sinful 
because of the moral and ethical challenges it creates when it sells goods on the market. 
In an article published by the Seven Pillars Institute for Global Finance and Ethics, an 
independent not-for-profit think tank, Rachel Thomas (2017) discusses the moral and 
ethical problems that are created by this industry. In her article, she explains how 
businesses, at the end of the day, need be profit maximizers while abiding to the legal 
landscape. However, she argues that the pharmaceutical industry presents an instance 
where social good might take precedent over profit maximizing. She notes that the role of 
pharmaceutical industry is to serve the public good—the nature of the industry is to 
provide medication to those who need it. She notes that in many cases, the demand for 
medication is inelastic, incentivizing the pharmaceutical companies to price their goods 
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incredibly high. This is exemplified with the actions of Martin Shkreli, aka “Pharma 
Bro,” when his company Turing Pharmaceuticals acquired manufacturing license for the 
drug Daraprim in 2015. Daraprim is a drug that treats a life-threatening parasitic 
infection; this infection, known as toxoplasmosis, is most deadly for AIDS and cancer 
patients. Once Shkreli acquired the manufacturing license for Daraprim, he marked up 
prices from $13.50 per tablet to $750 per tablet—a price increase of 5,455%. Similarly, 
Thomas (2017) points out that pharmaceutical companies have high operating costs that 
stem from research and development, fighting legal battles, and the distribution of their 
goods. The U.S. government incentivizes the creation and development of medication 
that promotes public good by granting patents and subsidies. Thomas (2017) highlights 
the moral and ethical dilemmas created by the pharmaceutical industry. Firms are 
incentivized to research and develop new medication, but the incentives create a 
monopolistic structure. Consequently, these firms can, and have, marked up prices in 
such a monstrous way because the demand for these medications is inelastic. For these 
reasons, I believe that investors will eventually perceive this industry sinful as socially 
responsible investing practices continue to grow.  
 Finally, I believe that investors will eventually perceive technology/social media 
companies sinful. Technology companies are creating a new epidemic around the 
world—they are contributing to the human addiction to contemporary digital products. In 
a recent New York Times article, author Claudia Dreifus (2017) interviews social 
psychologist Adam Alter. In his new book, Irresistible: The Rise of Addictive Technology 
and the Business of Keeping Us Hooked, Alter argues that humans of all ages are literally 
addicted to digital products, such as their phone. In their interview, Alter first defines 
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addiction as compulsively doing something you enjoy doing in the short term that 
undermines your well-being in the long term. He cites a scientific truth—when people are 
addicted to something, their brain will release a chemical called dopamine. Studies have 
shown that images of the human brain in front of slot machine—of a proclaimed addicted 
gambler—show similar results of images of the human brain looking at a video game or 
on their phone. He points to a few studies to bolster his argument that technology has 
fueled behavioral addictions—including a study that shows that 60% of adults keep their 
cell phones next to them when they sleep and another study that shows that half of the 
respondents check their emails during the night. Companies, such as Apple and Samsung, 
manufacture these devices which can cause users to become addicted. Furthermore, these 
devices support the growth of social media companies.  
Social media companies, such as Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat, contribute to 
the growth of the technology addiction around the world. These social media companies 
are dangerous because of the plethora of information they have access to. In April 2018, 
Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, testified in front of Congress. Senators from both 
sides of the aisle wanted to address the elephant in the room—should Facebook be 
regulated more by the government? Facebook was used by the Russians to interfere in the 
2016 Presidential election to promote “fake-news” media. Similarly, data from millions 
of Facebook users were collected without their explicit permission by a political 
consulting firm, Cambridge Analytica.6 When Facebook found out that Cambridge 
Analytica was harvesting data from their networks, Facebook didn’t notify the Federal 
                                                           
6 Kevin Roose and Cecilia Kang, “Mark Zuckerberg Testifies on Facebook Before Skeptical Lawmakers,” 
The New York Times, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/us/politics/zuckerberg-facebook-senate-
hearing.html. 
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Trade Commission because they believed it was a “closed case.” The most compelling 
discussion that came out of the Senate hearings was the debate between Senator Lindsey 
Graham and Mark Zuckerberg over increased regulation of Facebook. Zuckerberg said 
that there should be limited government regulation of Facebook—he argued that as the 
internet becomes more important it needs to be regulated in a proper manner.7 Similarly, 
social media is dangerous because of the adverse health effects associated with its usage. 
In an article from the Child Mind Institute, Caroline Miller (2017) discusses a series of 
studies that point to the link between social media usage and depression levels. 
According to several recent studies, teenagers and young adults that use Instagram and 
Facebook are shown to have higher rates of reported depression as compared to people 
who don’t use them. She notes that these studies show a correlation between social media 
usage and depression levels, not a causation between social media usage and depression 
levels. Despite this, the correlation between social media usage and reported depression 
levels is significant. She posits that depression is influenced by artificial connections—
where people become friends with each other over a social media platform and not in 
person. This kind of friendship tends to be less emotionally satisfying, and causes people 
to feel socially vacuous. Similarly, she notes that social media usage tends to negatively 
impact one’s self-esteem. This is particularly true for females, who see edited photos of 
beautiful woman all over social media and feel inadequate. The technology industry and 
the social media industry have created a technology addiction around the world. The 
technology companies bolster the addiction by creating a platform for these social media 
                                                           
7 Arjun Kharpal, “Mark Zuckerberg’s testimony: Here are the key points you need to know,” CNBC, 2018, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/11/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-testimony-key-points.html.  
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companies to grow and flourish. I believe that investors will eventually perceive these 
two industries sinful due to the industries’ ethical dilemmas and the adverse health effects 
correlated with their usage. 
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
 
The existing literature suggests four hypotheses. First, I hypothesize that socially 
responsible investing practices do not generate positive abnormal returns. Weil (2018) 
showed how socially responsible ETFs over the past decade underperformed as compared 
to the SPDR S&P 500 ETF. However, Weil (2018) did not use any capital asset pricing 
model analysis on the performance of socially responsible ETFs in his study.  
 
H1: Across all capital asset pricing models, socially responsible ETFs do not 
generate statistically significant positive abnormal returns since the funds’ 
inceptions. 
 
Second, I hypothesize that portfolios of sin stocks generate positive abnormal returns. 
While Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) use SIC codes to create portfolios of alcohol stocks, 
my portfolios are more robust and inclusive as I am intending to capture the performance 
of the industry as a whole. My portfolios of current sin stocks include more SIC codes 
than Hong and Kacperczyk’s (2009) portfolios of current sin stocks. I differentiate my 
study from theirs because I analyze the performance of the sinful industry as a whole—
including SIC codes related to manufacturing, distribution, bottling, etc. for all of my 
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sinful portfolios. My methodology for creating portfolios of current sin stocks, based on 
robust SIC codes intended to capture the sinful nature of the industry as a whole, is 
unique and provides a new method of examining the existence of the sin stock anomaly. 
The competing nature of the literature reviews on the sin stock anomaly need to be 
addressed further. Over the past couple of years, academic papers such as Fabozzi and 
Blitz (2017) and Adamsson and Hoepner (2015) claim that the sin stock anomaly is non-
existent once Fama-French Factor Models add more explanatory variables, such as 
momentum, profitability and investment. However, the original papers discussing the 
performance of sin stocks, such as Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant (2007) and Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) find overwhelming evidence that portfolios of sin stocks generate 
positive abnormal returns.  
 
H2: Portfolios of current sin stocks (alcohol, tobacco, gaming and aerospace & 
defense), generate positive and statistically significant levels of positive abnormal 
returns from 1977-2018. 
 
Third, I believe that as socially responsible investing practices continues to grow in U.S. 
equity markets, the following industries will eventually be perceived as sinful by both 
investors and institutions: sugary beverages, fast food/sugary foods, biotech & 
pharmaceuticals and tech/social media. As far as I am aware, I am the first person to 
argue that these industries will eventually be widely perceived as sinful and I am the first 
person to argue that portfolios of stocks from these industries may exhibit an increased 
level of positive abnormal returns if they are eventually perceived as sinful by both 
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institutions and individuals. I believe that the morally and ethically hazardous nature of 
these industries in the past, and present, has positively impacted the performance of 
portfolios of these industries—implying that portfolios of these future sin stocks have 
generated positive abnormal returns.  
 
H3: Across all capital asset pricing models, portfolios of future sin stocks 
generate positive and statistically significant levels of abnormal returns from 
1977-2018.  
 
Fourth, I believe that events that increase the perceived sinfulness of these industries 
result in greater levels of abnormal returns for sinful portfolios as compared to before 
they were deemed sinful. By choosing a critical point in time in which the perception of 
these industries’ morally and ethically hazardous nature spikes, we can compare the 
performance of the same portfolio before and after that critical point in time. As far as I 
am aware of, I am the first person to do event studies on the performance of these 
portfolios before and after these industries were widely perceived as sinful.  
 
H4: Portfolios of alcohol and tobacco stocks will generate larger positive levels of 
abnormal returns after their industries are widely perceived as sinful, as compared 
to before their industries are widely perceived as sinful, across capital asset 
pricing models.  
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4. Data and Methodology 
 
a. Socially Responsible Investing Data 
 
In order to analyze the performance of socially responsible investments, I chose to 
look at socially responsible exchange traded funds (ETFs) that were screened for basic 
ESG traits. Instead of creating portfolios of what I believe to be socially responsible 
stocks, I purposefully chose to look at ESG screened ETFs instead. The ETFs that I chose 
to analyze the performance of are representative of key ESG screens including workplace 
equality and low carbon exposure. First, the construction of these ETFs already creates 
portfolios of socially responsible stocks. Major investment advisors, such as Vanguard 
and BlackRock, create these ETFs in order to appeal to socially responsible investors. I 
believe that their incentives to create socially responsible ETFs warrants their usage for 
my analysis. Second, I chose to look at ETFs instead of creating my own portfolio of 
socially responsible stocks because of the ease in investing in ETFs. Investing in an ETF 
tends to be cheaper than creating a portfolio of stocks for the individual investor. Because 
of the work done and accessibility of ETFs, I believe they provide the best proxy for 
socially responsible investing performance. While I do believe that somebody could 
create a portfolio of socially responsible stocks and generate positive abnormal returns, I 
do not have any data on the topic nor do I think that the individual/institution who did 
would make it readily accessible.  
I chose to look at the performance of five socially responsible ETFs. While all of 
these ETFs are socially responsible, they all are different in some way. These funds 
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originate from different investment advisors and they all focus on different aspects of 
ESG traits. In this section, I list the ETF provider, some basic financial information, some 
of the top ten holdings of the fund, the reasoning behind the fund being socially 
responsible, and the ticker name denoted in parentheses. Similarly, I have collected the 
monthly returns of all of these ETFs. The monthly returns of some of these ETFs date 
back to 2006. On the other hand, I only have monthly returns from these some of these 
ETFs as recent as 2014. I believe that these monthly returns create a robust enough 
sample size to analyze the performance of these socially responsible investment vehicles. 
Figure 2 exhibits the total returns of my socially responsible ETFs since their inception. 
Similarly, Figure 2 shows the total return for the S&P 500 TR index and the Vice 
Fund—an ETF composed of sinful industries—since their inceptions.  
 The first ETF that I chose to analyze is the iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF 
(DSI). iShares is an ETF provider affiliated with BlackRock. iShares states that the 
objective of DSI is to, “track the investment results of an index composed of U.S. 
companies that have positive environmental, social and governance characteristics as 
identified by the index provider.”8 As of November 5th, 2018, DSI has over $1.1B in net 
assets and approximately twelve million shares outstanding. The top 10 holdings of the 
ETF include Microsoft, Alphabet, Facebook, Proctor and Gamble, Coca-Cola and Merck 
&Co. Inc. iShares highlights the sustainability characteristics of the fund. DSI has an 
ESG quality score of 6.6 out of ten according to MSCI, a global provider of investment 
decision support. Similarly, DSI has an ESG quality score (which is peer ranked) of 
                                                           
8 “iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF,” iShares by BlackRock, accessed November 18th, 2018, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239667/ishares-msci-kld-400-social-etf. 
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98.70 percent—implying that fund is in the 98th percentile of ESG quality scores based 
on MSCI’s data.9 I collected monthly returns of DSI from July 2010 to October 2018. 
The second socially responsible ETF I chose to analyze is iShares MSCI USA ESG 
Select ETF (SUSA). iShares states that the objective of SUSA is the same as DSI. 
However, the two funds are different. Using MSCI data, SUSA has a higher ESG quality 
score than DSI—8.2. Consequently, SUSA is in the 100th percentile ESG quality score 
rank, implying that it one of the most, if not the most, socially responsible ETF based on 
MSCI’s data. SUSA does have a smaller amount of net assets as compared to DSI 
($762M) and far fewer shares outstanding as compared to DSI (nearly seven million). 
Some of the funds top ten holdings include Microsoft, Apple, 3M, Rockwell Collins and 
BlackRock Inc.10 I collected the monthly returns of SUSA from January 2005 to October 
2018. 
The third socially responsible ETF I chose to analyze is First Trust NASDAQ Cln 
Edge GrnEngyETF (QCLN). First Trust is an investment advisor that offers investment 
products like BlackRock or VanEck. First Trust states that the goal of the fund is, “to 
seek investment results that correspond generally to the price and yield (before the Fund's 
fees and expenses) of an equity index called the NASDAQ Clean Edge® Green Energy 
IndexSM.11 Essentially, this ETF tracks an index that focuses on clean energy companies. 
Included in the index are “companies engaged in manufacturing, development, 
distribution and installation of emerging clean-energy technologies including, but not 
                                                           
9 iShares by BlackRock, “iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF.”  
10 “iShares MSCI USA Select ETF,” iShares by BlackRock, accessed November 18, 2018, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239692/ishares-msci-usa-esg-select-etf  
11 “First Trust NASDAQ Clean Edge Green Energy Index Fund (QCLN),” First Trust, accessed November 
18th, 2018, https://www.ftportfolios.com/Retail/Etf/EtfSummary.aspx?Ticker=QCLN 
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limited to, solar photovoltaics, biofuels and advanced batteries.”12 As of 11/5/2018, 
QCLN has total net assets of $89M and 4.6M shares outstanding. Some of the ETFs top 
ten holdings include Tesla Inc., Albemarle Corporation, Acuity Brands, Inc., and Hexcel 
Corporation. I collected monthly returns from February 2007 to October 2018. 
The fourth socially responsible ETF I chose to analyze is iShares MSCI ACWI Low 
Carbon Target ETF (CRBN). Like DSI and SUSA, CRBN is offered by iShares. 
According to iShares, the objective of the fund is to, “track the investment results of an 
index composed of large and mid-capitalization developed and emerging market equities 
with a lower carbon exposure than that of the broad market.”13 CRBN appeals to socially 
responsible investors who want both exposure to a global portfolio and to invest in 
companies with a low carbon footprint. According to MSCI data, CRBN has an ESG 
quality score of 5.8—it lags behind DSI’s and SUSA’s ESG quality score. CRBN has 
$522M worth of net assets and it has 4.6M shares outstanding. Some of the funds top ten 
holdings include Apple Inc., Amazon Com Inc., Johnson & Johnson, Facebook and 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. I collected monthly returns from December 2014 to October 
2018. 
The fifth socially responsible ETF I chose to analyze is the Workplace Equality ETF 
(EQLT). This fund is offered by Segall Bryant and Hamill, an independent investment 
firm. According to the firm, “The Workplace Equality Portfolio ETF invests in publicly-
traded companies that support lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) equality in 
                                                           
12 First Trust, “First Trust NASDAQ Clean Edge Green Energy Index Fund (QCLN).” 
13 “iShares MSCI Low Carbon Target ETF,” iShares by BlackRock, accessed November 20, 2018, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/271054/ishares-msci-acwi-low-carbon-target-etf. 
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the workplace.”14 One of the most significant screens for this ETF is that the company 
must include “mandatory language in a company's equal employment opportunity (EEO) 
statement prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, 
offering health benefits to same-sex partners or spouses of employees, along with other 
corporate benefits and privileges.” EQLT has $21M worth of net assets. Some of the 
funds top holdings include Global Eagle Entertainment, Nvidia Corp., Walt Disney Co., 
Under Armour and American Eagle Outfitters. I collected monthly returns from February 
2014 to October 2018. 
 
b. Sin Stock Data 
 
i. Portfolio Construction for Current Sin Stocks   
 
In order to analyze the performance of sin stocks and to see if the sin stock anomaly 
exists, I created portfolios of the current sinful industries—alcohol, tobacco, gaming, and 
aerospace & defense. In previous examinations of the sin stock anomaly, researchers 
created sinful portfolios in a few different ways. Some researches created sinful 
portfolios based on existing benchmarks. For example, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) 
created sinful portfolios based on NAICS (North American Industry Classification 
System) groupings and limited SIC code groupings. Blitz and Fabozzi (2017) created 
sinful portfolios based on Fama-French industry groups. In all of my academic research 
                                                           
14 “The Workplace Equality Portfolio ETF—EQLT,” EQLT: Workplace Equality Portfolio, accessed 
November 20, 2018, http://www.eqltfund.com. 
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on the topic, I didn’t see anyone create as robust sinful portfolios based on SIC codes. 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) used SIC codes to create their sinful portfolios but I used 
more SIC codes than they did in an attempt to see the performance of the industry as a 
whole. Using SIC codes to create my sinful portfolios, I then gathered a comprehensive 
dataset from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) platform. I collected monthly 
stock returns from June 1977 until June 2018. These stock returns were paired with their 
respective SIC code—denoting SIC grouping with the return. In total, my dataset had 
over 3.5 million observations. I then filtered the dataset based on SIC codes to create my 
current sinful portfolios. These portfolios of current sin stocks are equal-weighted—I felt 
that this type of portfolio construction would be the best because it evenly distributes the 
magnitude of the performance for each security.  
The first sinful portfolio that I created was alcohol. I filtered my dataset with the 
following SIC codes to create my alcohol portfolio: 5181 (Beer and Ale,) 5182 (Wine 
and Distilled Alcoholic Beverages), 2083 (Malt), 2084 (Wines, Brandy, and Brandy 
Spirits), 2085(Distilled and Blended Liquors), and 5813 (Drinking Places [Alcoholic 
Beverages]). Companies included in this portfolio include Diageo LLC and Constellation 
Brands—two of the largest alcohol companies in the world. Once I created my alcohol 
portfolio, I had monthly stock returns from June 1977 to June 2018.  
The second sinful portfolio that I created was tobacco. I filtered my dataset with the 
following SIC codes to create my tobacco portfolio: 2111 (Cigarettes), 2121 (Cigars), 
2131 (Chewing and Smoking Tobacco and Snuff), 2141 (Tobacco Stemming and 
Redrying), 5194(Tobacco and Tobacco Products), 5993 (Tobacco Stores and Stands), and 
0132 (Tobacco). Companies included in this portfolio include Phillip Morris and R J 
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Reynolds. Once I created my tobacco portfolio, I had monthly stock returns from June 
1977 to June 2018.  
The third sinful portfolio that I created was gaming. I filtered my dataset with the 
following SIC codes to create my gaming portfolio: 7993(Coin-operated Amusement 
Devices), 8741 (Management Services), 7011 (Hotels and Motels), and 7948 (Racing, 
including Track Operation). Some of the companies included in this portfolio include Las 
Vegas Sands and MGM Resorts. Once I created my gaming portfolio, I had monthly 
stock returns from June 1977 to June 2018. 
The fourth sinful portfolio that I created was aerospace & defense. I filtered my 
dataset with the following SIC codes to create my aerospace & defense portfolio: 3721 
(Aircraft), 3764 (Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Propulsion Units and Propulsion 
Unit Parts), 348 (Ordnance and Accessories, except Vehicles and Guided Missiles), 3812 
(Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical and Nautical Systems), 3679 
(Electric Components, not elsewhere classified) and 7371 (Computer Programming 
Services). Some of the companies in this portfolio include Raytheon, Northrop Grumman 
and Remington Arms Co. This portfolio was created to capture significant aspects of both 
the aerospace industry and the defense industry. Once I created my portfolio, I had 
monthly stock returns from June 1977 until June 2018.  
 
ii. Portfolio Construction for Future Sin Stocks 
 
The first “future sin stock” portfolio I created was sugary beverages. I filtered my 
dataset with the following SIC codes to create my sugary beverage portfolio: 2086 
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(Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks and Carbonated Waters), 2087 (Flavoring Extracts and 
Flavoring Syrups, Not Elsewhere Classified), and 3121(Beverage Manufacturing), and 
5812 (Eating Places). Some of the companies in this portfolio include the Coca-Cola Co. 
and the Starbucks Corporation. This portfolio does a good job getting all elements of this 
sinful industry involved—from the actual manufactures of the product to the producers of 
the artificial sweeteners. Once I created this portfolio, I was able to get monthly stock 
returns from June 1977 to June 2018. All of my portfolios of future sin stocks are equal-
weighted—I felt that this type of portfolio construction would be the best because it 
evenly distributes the magnitude of the performance for each security.  
The second “future sin stock” portfolio I created was fast food/sugary food 
companies. I filtered my dataset with the following SIC codes to create my sugary food 
portfolio: 2041 (Flour and other Grain Mill Products), 2043 (Cereal Breakfast Foods), 
2045 (Prepared Flour Mixes and Doughs), 2051 (Bread and other Bakery Products), 2052 
(Cookies and Crackers), 2065 (Candy and other Confectionary Products), 2066 
(Chocolate and Cocoa Products), 2096 (Potato Chips, Corn Chips and Similar Snacks), 
5441 (Candy, Nut, and Confectionary Stores), and 5812 (Eating Places). Some of the 
companies in this portfolio include McDonald’s and Hershey. I believe the large amount 
of SIC codes used to filter this portfolio show how broad and expansive this industry is 
and how so many companies are all connected by usage of sugar and the adverse health 
effects associated with eating their products.  Once I created this portfolio, I was able to 
get monthly stock returns from June 1977 to June 2018 
The third “future sin stock” portfolio I created was biotech and pharmaceuticals. I 
filtered my data with the following SIC codes to create my biotech and pharmaceuticals 
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portfolio: 2834 (Pharmaceutical Preparations) and 8731 (Commercial Physical and 
Biological Research). While this portfolio is filtered using only two SIC codes, I feel that 
these two SIC codes are the most representative of each industry—biotech and 
pharmaceuticals. Some of the companies included in this portfolio include Pfizer, 
Novartis and Gilead Sciences. Once I created this portfolio, I had monthly stock returns 
from June 1977 to June 2018.  
The fourth “future sin stock” portfolio I created was tech/social media. I filtered my 
data with the following SIC codes to create my tech/social media portfolio: 7371 
(Computer Programming Services), 7374 (Computer Processing and Dara Preparation 
and Processing Services), and 5734 (Computer and Computer Software Stores). Some of 
the companies included in this portfolio include Facebook, Google and Apple. These 
three SIC codes capture the companies involved in the tech industry and the social media 
industry. Once I created this portfolio, I had monthly stock returns from June 1977 to 
June 2018.  
 
5. Methodology for Linear Regression Models 
 
a. Regression Models 
 
To see the performance of portfolios of current sin stocks, “future” sin stocks and 
socially responsible ETFs, I used three different capital asset pricing models (CAPM). 
The traditional CAPM model states: 
𝐸𝑅𝑖 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝐵𝑖(𝐸𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) 
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Where 𝐸𝑅𝑖 is equal to the expected return on investment, 𝑟𝑓 is equal to the risk-free rate, 
𝐵𝑖 is equal to the Beta of the investment (measurement of volatility in comparison to the 
entire market,) 𝐸𝑅𝑚 is the expected return of the market and (𝐸𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) is the market 
risk premium. Essentially, the traditional CAPM describes an asset’s relationship 
between its systematic risk and its expected return.  
The first CAPM model I used was the Fama-French Three Factor Model. Fama 
and French (1993) identify and create three distinct factors that help explain variation in 
stock returns—a market factor, a firm size factor, and a book-to-market factor. The 
results from their empirical studies solidified the explanatory power of their variables in 
identifying variation in stock returns. In their model, they take traditional CAPM and 
expand on it. The Fama French 3 Factor Model states: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡is the expected excess return, 𝛼𝑡 is the alpha—or excess return—
generated at time ‘t’, 𝐵𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) is market variable 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the average return on 
three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the 
average return on two portfolios—with high book-to-market ratios minus low book-to-
market ratios, and Ɛ𝑖𝑡 is the error term for each portfolio “i” at time “t”. Fama and French 
(1993) found that the three factors—market, HML and SMB—capture a statistically 
significant fraction of the variation in stock returns.  
The second CAPM model I used is the Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus 
Momentum. Carhart (1997) solidifies the explanatory power of the three Fama-French 
factors and introduces a new variable—momentum. This momentum factor describes a 
tendency in stock prices—if stock prices are rising, they tend to continue to rise and if 
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stock prices are falling, they tend to continue to fall. The Fama-French 3 Factor Model 
plus Momentum states: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
In an article from Seeking Alpha, Bortolotti (2016) explains that the momentum factor is 
calculated by taking the average return on the two high prior returns portfolios minus the 
average return on the two low prior returns portfolios. Similarly, he states that the time 
table for the momentum factor is anywhere from 2 to 12 months as stocks have the 
tendency to revert to the mean over periods of several years. Essentially, the Fama-
French 3 Factor Model including the momentum factor is a more complete CAPM than 
the Fama-French 3 Factor Model. More importantly, it is useful to see how this model 
affects the level alpha generated by the socially responsible ETFs, the current sin stocks, 
and the future sin stocks.  
 The third CAPM model I used is the Fama-French 5 Factor Model, introduced by 
Titman, Wei and Xie (2004). In this CAPM, they expand the Fama-French 3 Factor 
Model by adding two new variables that help analyze variation in stock returns—the 
profitability and the investment factor. The profitability factor aims at exploring the 
variation in stock returns by focusing on the ratio of gross profits to total assets. 
Economists believe that the profitability factor helps explain variation in stock prices by 
creating a positive relationship between profitability and stock returns.15 On the other 
hand, the investment factor aims to explain variation in stock prices by looking at a firm’s 
capital expenditures. Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) find a negative relationship between 
                                                           
15 Vikas Kalra and Christian Celis, “Research Insight: Introducing the Profitability Factor,” MSCI, (2016): 
2. 
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capital expenditures and stock returns—firms that increased their capital expenditures the 
most were the firms that underperformed the most, based on their benchmarks. On a 
similar note, they found a significant piece of evidence regarding the term they call 
“greater investment discretion.” They point to their analysis and say that firms that have 
greater investment discretion (firms with less debt or more cash flows) have a stronger 
negative relationship between capital expenditures and stock returns as compared to firms 
that have less investment discretion. The Fama-French 5 Factor Model states: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡is the expected excess return, 𝛼𝑡 is the alpha—or excess return—
generated at time ‘t’, 𝐵𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) is market variable 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the average return on 
three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the 
average return on two portfolios—with high book-to-market ratios minus low book-to-
market ratios, and Ɛ𝑖𝑡 is the error term for each portfolio “i” at time “t”. The two new 
factors, profitability and investment, look at the difference of stock returns of two distinct 
portfolios. 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 examines the difference of stock returns from a portfolio with robust 
profitability as compared to the stock returns from a portfolio with weak profitability. 
𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 examines the difference of stock returns from a portfolio with low investment 
firms as compared to the stock returns from a portfolio with high investment firms. The 
Fama-French 5 Factor Model is the most complete CAPM in my study. The five 
significant variables it employs is the most significant asset pricing model in my study to 
explain the variation in stock prices and to help explore my results. 
 These three distinct factor models are used to examine the performance of socially 
responsible ETFs, portfolios of current sin stocks and portfolios of future sin stocks. 
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Across all data analysis, I use a simple linear regression model to see the explanatory 
power of each variable, the significance of each factor on the variation in the data, and 
the statistical significance of each factor on the variation in returns. I set up my linear 
regression as follows. My dependent variable (left-side of the equation) is my “return” 
variable. This variable is the return of the stock/ETF at time “t” minus the risk-free rate at 
time “t.” Essentially, this variable is the premium—or excess return—from investing in 
this security rather than in a risk-free asset. My independent variables (right-side of the 
equation) consist of the “market” variable (excess return on the market minus the risk-
free rate), “size” variable, “value” variable, “momentum” variable, “profitability” 
variable and the “investment” variable and the intercept—alpha—which shows the 
potential excess returns generated in the model. 
All of these linear regressions have monthly stock returns dating back from June 
1977 to October 2018. These monthly stock returns will be used to explore the 
performance and levels of alpha (if any) generated from my portfolios of current and 
future sin stocks. When I examine the performance of socially responsible ETFs, I use 
their monthly returns instead. I have Fama-French factors of market, size, value and 
momentum from 1977-2018. However, the profitability and investment factors do not 
cover that same time horizon since they were recently formulated by Fama and French 
for public use. The time horizon of these variables span from July 1990 until October 
2018. This shrinkage in months (number of observations) decreases my R-squared values 
as compared the R-squared values generated in the Fama-French 3 Factor Model and the 
Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum.  
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6. Results 
 
a. The Performance of Socially Responsible ETFs 
 
When I regressed the monthly returns of socially responsible ETFs on the Fama-
French 3 Factor Model, I got a few interesting results. Since their inception, EQLT and 
DSI generated almost no alpha. All of their monthly alpha coefficients were less than 
0.001—implying that there was virtually no alpha generated based on this model. 
Similarly, the ETFs had very low t-statistics and high P > |t|, implying that the alpha 
coefficient isn’t statistically significant and doesn’t have a large impact on my return 
variable (dependent variable.) On the other hand, SUSA and QCLN generated negative 
monthly alphas of -0.001 and -0.008, respectively. These results support the findings of 
Weil (2018). By showcasing the negative monthly alphas generated, my model confirms 
that these ETFs generated negative annualized total returns. Furthermore, SUSA and 
QCLN generated t-stats of -1.68 and -1.94, respectively, and P > |t| of 0.096 and 0.054, 
respectively. These two findings help validate the negative monthly alpha generated by 
the ETFs, proving that these socially responsible ETFs generated negative returns since 
their inceptions. Interestingly, CRBN generated a monthly alpha of 0.008 which was the 
highest of all socially responsible ETFs. It had a t-stat of 1.40 and P > |t| value of 0.168. 
These results showcase the fact that CRBN has generated a positive monthly alpha since 
inception, but it is not statistically significant as we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
alpha coefficient is zero.  
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The Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum generated similar results. 
EQLT, CRBN and DSI generated the same levels of alpha that were generated in the 3 
Factor Model. These monthly alphas were so small, implying that these ETFs generated 
virtually no excess return. All of their t values increased and their P > |t| values got 
smaller. These findings prove to be insignificant as these monthly alphas do not have a 
significant effect on my “return” variable. The 3 Factor Model plus Momentum produced 
similar results for SUSA and QCLN—the two ETFs generated negative monthly alpha 
values. More importantly, SUSA and QCLN had t-stats of -1.61 and -1.92, respectively, 
and P > |t| values of 0.110 and 0.058. These statistics help validate the fact that these two 
socially responsible ETFs generated negative returns since their inception. CRBN 
produced similar results in this model as it did in the Fama-French 3 Factor Model. It had 
a monthly alpha of .009, a t-stat of 1.52 and a P > |t| value of 0.138. Like the results from 
the Fama-French 3 Factor Model, they showcase the fact that CRBN has generated a 
positive monthly alpha since inception, but it is not statistically significant as we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that alpha coefficient is zero.  
The Fama-French 5 Factor Model produced the same kind of results for EQLT, 
CRBN and DSI as the other two linear regression models. They produced incredibly 
small levels of monthly alpha and their t-stats and P > |t| values were insignificant and 
useless in our understanding of the model, as they aren’t useful in understanding the 
monthly alphas impact on my return variable. Like the Fama-French 3 Factor Model and 
the Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum, the Fama-French 5 Factor Model once 
again produced negative monthly alphas for SUSA and QCLN (-0.001 and -0.006, 
respectively.)  SUSA and QCLN produced large t-stats (-2.02 and -1.56, respectively,) 
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and small P > |t| values (0.045 and 0.120, respectively.) These findings are crucial 
because they help confirm the fact these two socially responsible ETFs generated 
negative returns since inception. CRBN once again produced the highest monthly alpha 
value in the Fama-French 5 Factor Model (.008.) It had a t-stat of 1.44 and P > |t| value of 
0.158.  
While I was running my linear regression models on the returns of these socially 
responsible ETFs, I thought it would be interesting to compare the performance of a 
socially responsible ETF to a sinful ETF. I collected monthly returns from the Vice Fund 
(MUTF: VICEX), an ETF whose portfolio consists of alcohol, tobacco, gaming, and 
aerospace and defense stocks. Since its inception in 2002, the Vice Fund has 
outperformed the S&P 500 and its performance is widely cited as a prime example to 
bolster the claims of the sin stock anomaly. When I used my three linear regression 
models on the Vice Fund, I got a few interesting results. First, VICEX generated positive 
monthly abnormal returns since its inception. Second, VICEX generated t-stats of 0.97, 
0.93 and 0.69 in the Fama-French 3 Factor Model, the Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus 
Momentum, and the Fama-French 5 Factor Model, respectively. These t-stat values help 
confirm the fact the VICE fund generates some kind of monthly alpha (dissimilar to zero) 
and it bolsters the evidence of its positive performance over time. However, across all 
linear regression models, VICEX generates high levels of P > |t|, making it hard to 
interpret the results. Third, across all linear models, VICEX has the smallest R-squared 
values when they are compared to the R-squared values across the socially responsible 
ETFs (except for CRBN). However, VICEX has existed the longest, implying that it has 
the largest amount of observations. I believe that there are some things that are not being 
49 | L o r i  
 
captured in my CAPM models that would help prove its exceptional performance since 
inception.  
When looking at all of the results from this analysis, it is fair to say a few things. 
First, all of my CAPM models validate the atrocious performance of the SUSA and 
QCLN. These two ETFs have generated negative returns since inception, failing to beat 
the market. Second, DSI and CRBN do not produce any significant results—their 
monthly alphas are virtually non-existent and their t-stats and P > |t| values prove to be 
inconclusive. Finally, all of my linear regression models lead me to believe that CRBN, 
since inception, has generated positive monthly alphas. This performance can be traced 
back to a point that Weil (2018) makes in his article, noting that socially responsible 
ETFs have outperformed the market in the most recent fiscal year. CRBN has the 
smallest amount of monthly observations (43) of all of my socially responsible ETFs in 
my study, which I believe helps explain the positive performance of this particular ETF. 
My analysis of the performance of socially responsible ETFs leads me to believe that 
there is a negative relationship between number of monthly observations and levels of 
monthly alpha generated. Based on my analysis, I cannot find any other socially 
responsible ETF besides CRBN that generated a positive monthly alpha and has 
significant t-stats and P > |t| values that bolster the fact that the monthly alpha coefficient 
has a significant impact on my return variable. However, based on my analysis, I can 
point to the performance of SUSA and QCLN in all three of the linear models I use to 
prove that these socially responsible ETFs generated negative monthly levels of alpha 
and their t-stats and P >|t| values point to the fact that their negative monthly alpha 
coefficients have a significant impact on my return variable.  
50 | L o r i  
 
 
b. The Performance of Current Sin Stocks—Does the Sin Stock Anomaly 
Exist? 
 
Using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model, I analyzed portfolios of current sin stocks 
to see if these portfolios generated monthly alphas. After running my linear regression 
model, portfolios of alcohol, tobacco, gaming and aerospace & defense stocks generated 
positive monthly alphas (0.006, 0.01, 0.004 and 0.006, respectively.) More importantly, 
these portfolios of current sin stocks generated huge t-stats and miniscule P > |t| values on 
the monthly alpha coefficient. Alcohol generated a t-stat of 4.01 and a P > |t| of 0.000. 
Tobacco generated a t-stat of 4.97 and a P > |t| value of 0.000. Gaming generated a t-stat 
of 2.85 and a P > |t| value of 0.004. Aerospace & defense generated a t-stat of 4.27 and a 
P > |t| value of 0.000. Based on the results of my Fama-French 3 Factor Model, it is clear 
to see that portfolios of all current sin stocks generated positive monthly alphas and their 
t-stats and P > |t| values solidify the positive significant impact of monthly alpha variable 
on my return variable.  
I then analyzed portfolios of current sin stocks using the Fama-French 3 Factor 
Model plus Momentum to see if these portfolios generated monthly alphas. After running 
my linear regression model, portfolios of alcohol, tobacco, gaming and aerospace & 
defense stocks generated positive monthly alphas (0.007, 0.011, 0.006 and 0.008, 
respectively.) These results led to a shocking conclusion—the monthly alpha generated in 
each portfolio was larger for each sinful industry based on the Fama-French 3 Factor 
Model plus Momentum than the monthly alpha generated in each sinful portfolio based 
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on the Fama-French 3 Factor Model. Furthermore these portfolios of current sin stocks 
generated huge t-stats and miniscule P > |t| values on the monthly alpha coefficient. 
Alcohol generated a t-stat of 3.85 and a P > |t| of 0.000. Tobacco generated a t-stat of 
4.95 and a P > |t| value of 0.000. Gaming generated a t-stat of 3.60 and a P > |t| value of 
0.000. Aerospace & Defense generated a t-stat of 5.01 and a P > |t| value of 0.000. Based 
on the results of my Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum, it is clear to see that 
portfolios of all current sin stocks generated positive monthly alphas and their t-stats and 
P > |t| values solidify the positive significant impact of monthly alpha variable on my 
return variable.  
Finally, I analyzed the performance of portfolios of current sin stocks by using the 
Fama-French 5 Factor Model to see if these portfolios generated monthly alphas. After 
running my linear regression models, portfolios of alcohol, tobacco, gaming and 
aerospace & defense stocks generated positive monthly alphas (0.005, 0.006, 0.001 and 
0.009, respectively.) Furthermore these portfolios of current sin stocks generated huge t-
stats and small P > |t| values on the monthly alpha coefficient. Alcohol generated a t-stat 
of 2.63 and a P > |t| of 0.009. Tobacco generated a t-stat of 2.12 and a P > |t| value of 
0.035. Gaming generated a t-stat of 0.54 and a P > |t| value of 0.589. Aerospace & 
defense generated a t-stat of 3.96 and a P > |t| value of 0.000. Based on the results of my 
Fama-French 5 Factor Model, it is clear to see that portfolios of all current sin stocks 
generated positive monthly alphas and their t-stats and P > |t| values (except for the 
portfolio of gaming) solidify the positive significant impact of monthly alpha variable on 
my return variable.  
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Based on my data analysis using three distinct linear regression models, I have 
proved the existence of the sin stock anomaly. Across all CAPM models, portfolios of sin 
stocks generated positive monthly alphas. Furthermore, the alpha coefficient generated by 
each sinful portfolio across all CAPM models exhibited huge t-stats and low P > |t| values 
(except for gaming when using the five-factor model.)  
 
c. The Performance of Future Sin Stocks 
 
Using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model, I analyzed portfolios of future sin stocks 
to see if these portfolios generated monthly alphas. After running my linear regression 
model, portfolios of sugary beverages, fast food/sugary foods, biotech & pharmaceuticals 
and tech/social media generated positive monthly alphas (0.003, 0.003, 0.008 and 0.006, 
respectively.) More importantly, these portfolios of current sin stocks generated huge t-
stats and miniscule P > |t| values on the monthly alpha coefficient. Sugary beverages 
generated a t-stat of 2.01 and a P > |t| of 0.045. Fast food/sugary food generated a t-stat of 
2.22 and a P > |t| value of 0.027. Biotech & pharmaceuticals generated a t-stat of 4.68 and 
a P > |t| value of 0.000. Tech/social media generated a t-stat of 3.32 and a P > |t| value of 
0.001. Based on the results of my Fama-French 3 Factor Model, it is clear to see that 
portfolios of all future sin stocks generated positive monthly alphas and their t-stats and P 
> |t| values solidify the positive significant impact of monthly alpha variable on my return 
variable. These findings imply that we can reject the null hypothesis that the alpha 
coefficient is equal to zero using a 95% confidence interval.  
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I then analyzed portfolios of current sin stocks using the Fama-French 3 Factor 
Model plus Momentum to see if these portfolios generated monthly alphas. After running 
my linear regression model, portfolios sugary beverages, fast food/sugary foods, biotech 
& pharmaceuticals and tech/social media of generated positive monthly alphas (0.004, 
0.004, 0.009 and 0.009, respectively.) These results led to a shocking conclusion—the 
monthly alpha generated in each portfolio was larger for each sinful industry based on the 
Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum than the monthly alpha generated in each 
sinful portfolio based on the Fama-French 3 Factor Model. Furthermore, these portfolios 
of current sin stocks generated huge t-stats and miniscule P > |t| values on the monthly 
alpha coefficient. Sugary beverages generated a t-stat of 2.50 and a P > |t| of 0.013. Fast 
food/sugary food generated a t-stat of 2.63 and a P > |t| value of 0.009. Biotech & 
pharmaceuticals generated a t-stat of 5.03 and a P > |t| value of 0.000. Tech/social media 
generated a t-stat of 4.46 and a P > |t| value of 0.000.  Based on the results of my Fama-
French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum, it is clear to see that portfolios of all current sin 
stocks generated positive monthly alphas and their t-stats and P > |t| values solidify the 
positive significant impact of monthly alpha variable on my return variable. Like the 
results from the Fama-French 3 Factor Model, these findings imply that we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the alpha coefficient is equal to zero using a 95% confidence interval.  
Finally, I analyzed the performance of portfolios of future sin stocks by using the 
Fama-French 5 Factor Model to see if these portfolios generated monthly alphas. After 
running my linear regression models, portfolios of sugary beverages, fast food/sugary 
foods, biotech & pharmaceuticals and tech/social media generated positive monthly 
alphas (0.0008, 0.0005, 0.007 and 0.007, respectively.) However, the results from the 
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Fama-French Five Factor Model show us that portfolios of sugary beverages and fast 
food/sugary foods do not generate statistically significant alphas. Sugary beverages had a 
t-stat of 0.43 and a P > |t| value of 0.670. Similarly, fast food/sugary food had a t-stat of 
0.33 and a P > |t| value of 0.744. The results from the Fama-French Five Factor model 
exhibit a statically significant positive alpha coefficient for portfolios of biotech & 
pharmaceuticals and tech/social media. Biotech & pharmaceuticals had a t-stat of 2.87 
and a P > |t| value of 0.004. Tech/social media had a t-stat of 2.60 and a P > |t| value of 
0.01. From these results, we can’t reject the null hypothesis that the alpha coefficient is 
zero for portfolios of sugary beverages and fast food/sugary food. On the other hand, we 
can reject the null hypothesis that the alpha coefficient is zero for portfolios of biotech & 
pharmaceuticals and tech/social media with a 95% confidence interval.  
Based on my data analysis using three distinct linear regression models, I have 
come to a series of conclusions about what I believe will ultimately be future sinful 
industries. Using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model and the Fama-French 3 Factor Model 
plus Momentum, all of my portfolios of future sin stocks generated a positive monthly 
alpha. These findings were backed by high t-stats and low P > |t| values, implying that we 
can reject the null hypothesis that the alpha coefficient is zero with a 95% confidence 
interval. Second, the Fama-French 5 Factor Model showcased that portfolios of sugary 
beverages and fast food/sugary food didn’t generate a statistically significant alpha 
coefficient. While their monthly alpha coefficients were positive, their t-stats and P > |t| 
values prove that we cannot reject the null hypothesis is zero with a 95% confidence 
interval. On the other hand, portfolios of biotech & pharmaceuticals and tech/social 
media generated a statistically significant positive monthly alpha. Their high t-stats and 
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low P > |t| values imply that we can reject the null hypothesis that the monthly alpha 
coefficient is zero with a 95% confidence interval. Third, the performance of portfolios of 
future sin stocks is eerily comparable to the performance of current sin stocks across all 
factor models I use in my study. Portfolios of current sin stocks have generated similar 
levels of alpha as compared to portfolios of future sin stocks. Both current and future 
portfolios of sin stocks across all factor models had very high t-stats and very low P > |t| 
values, implying that we can reject the null hypothesis that the monthly alpha coefficient 
is zero—resulting in some form of over performance compared to the market.  
 
7. Event Studies—Performance of Current Sinful Industries Before and After 
Becoming Sinful 
 
a. Introduction 
 
Based on my data analysis of portfolios of current and future sin stocks, I have 
reached three conclusions. First, portfolios of current sin stocks generated a statistically 
significant positive monthly alpha across three distinct capital asset pricing models. 
Second, I have proved that all my portfolios of future sin stocks generated a statistically 
significant positive monthly alpha using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model and the Fama-
French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum. Third, portfolios of biotech & pharmaceutical 
companies and portfolios of tech/social media companies generated a statistically 
significant positive monthly alpha across all factor models. 
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A central argument for my thesis is that as socially responsible investing practices 
in U.S. equity markets continues to grow, individuals and institutions will eventually 
deem the following industries sinful: sugary beverages, fast food/sugary food, biotech & 
pharmaceuticals and tech/social media. I believe that if the sin stock anomaly exists, 
portfolios of these “future” sin stocks will generate larger levels of positive abnormal 
returns after they become sinful as compared to before they were perceived as sinful. If 
all of this were to be true, an investment strategy taking a long position in these future 
sinful industries would be advantageous in the immediate and long term time horizon. 
After running my data analysis, I believe that my models prove that the sin stock 
anomaly exists. My results prove that the four current sinful industries—alcohol, tobacco, 
gaming and aerospace & defense—have produced a statistically significant monthly 
alpha across all factor models, except for gaming when using the Fama-French 5 Factor 
Model. The results are overwhelmingly supportive of the existence of the sin stock 
anomaly. Since my results point to the existence of the sin stock anomaly, I believe that 
stocks of future sinful industries—sugary beverages, fast food/sugary food, biotech & 
pharmaceuticals and tech/social media—will eventually benefit from the sin stock 
anomaly once these industries are perceived as sinful by institutions and investors. 
Since I cannot predict the future performance of these future sinful industries, I 
cannot definitively pinpoint the performance of portfolios of these sin stocks going 
forward. However, I analyzed the performance of portfolios of current sin stocks—
alcohol and tobacco—before their industries were widely perceived as sinful, and after 
their industries were widely perceived as sinful. For these two industries, I have isolated a 
critical point in time in which I believe their industries became widely perceived as 
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sinful. From there, I examined the performance of portfolios of these two industries 
before and after that critical point in time. Once again, I created my portfolios with the 
same SIC codes, used the same linear regression models, and implemented the Fama-
French 3 Factor Model and the Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum. After 
comparing the monthly alpha coefficient for both industries before and after the critical 
point in time in which they are recognized as sinful, I further bolstered my thesis. I found 
that portfolios of alcohol and tobacco stocks generated a statistically significant positive 
monthly alpha after they were perceived as sinful. More importantly, these portfolios of 
sin stocks generated larger levels of alpha after they were perceived as sinful—as 
compared to before they were perceived as sinful—by institutions and investors.  
 
b. Event Studies 
 
i. Tobacco Industry in U.S. Equity Markets 
 
The tobacco industry, one of the three industries in the “triumvirate of sin,” is the 
most commonly recognized sinful industry by both institutions and investors. 
Overwhelming research over the past century has cited the adverse health effects of using 
tobacco products—including lung and throat cancer, periodontal diseases, and coronary 
thrombosis (heart attack).16 Despite the countless research done every year validating the 
adverse health effects of using tobacco products, cigarette and smokeless tobacco 
                                                           
16 “Issue Health Effects,” The Tobacco Atlas, accessed November 22, 2018, 
https://tobaccoatlas.org/topic/health-effects/. 
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companies continue to advertise their products, spending billions of dollars every year 
marketing their products.17  
Despite the abundance of adverse news, tobacco companies continue to rake in 
billions of dollars in profit. A prime example of the exceptional performance of tobacco 
companies is Phillip Morris (ticker: PM.) A CNN article written in 2015 by Morgan 
Housel discusses the performance of the “most successful company in the world.” Housel 
(2015) explains that $1 invested in Phillip Morris in 1968 was worth approximately 
$6,400 in 2015—a 639,000% increase over the time period. Housel also cites why 
tobacco stocks have done exceptionally well over time, including the fact that low 
investor demand keeps tobacco stock valuations low; he even claims that the more hated 
an investment is, the higher future returns are likely to be.  
In order to compare the performance of the tobacco industry before and after it 
was widely perceived as sinful, I needed to pick a critical point in time in which the 
industry was widely viewed as sinful by both institutions and investors. In 1964, the 
Surgeon General of the United States published the following finding regarding cigarette 
smoking, “Cigarette smoking is causally related to lung cancer in men; the magnitude of 
the effect of cigarette smoking far outweighs all other factors. The data for women, 
though less extensive, point in the same direction.”18 This statement by the Surgeon 
General was one of the most critical points in time for people to perceive the tobacco 
                                                           
17 “Tobacco Industry Marketing,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed November 22, 
2018, https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/tobacco_industry/marketing/index.htm. 
18 “The Health Consequences of Smoking—50 Years of Progress: A Report of the Surgeon General,” 
National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (US) Office on Smoking and 
Health, accessed November 23, 2018, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK294310/. 
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industry as sinful; however, this report by the Surgeon General was not the most 
significant point in time for deeming the tobacco industry sinful. 
I believe that the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1970 was the most 
critical point in time for the tobacco industry to be perceived as sinful. The bill, which 
was signed by Richard Nixon in April 1970, banned cigarette companies from advertising 
their products on television and radio. Tobacco companies had been advertising their 
products on radio and television since WWII and their advertisements reached millions of 
Americans. I believe that this act is the critical point in time in which the tobacco 
industry is widely perceived as sinful for two reasons. First, this act was implemented by 
the U.S. government and the actions of the U.S. government exhibit the national efforts 
made by our country to help protect our citizens from dangerous products. Second, and 
more importantly, this act bolsters the claim made by the Surgeon General in 1964, 
validating the report and findings released to the public.  
In order to support my hypothesis that portfolios of future sin stocks will generate 
larger excess returns once they are perceived as sinful, I compared the performance of 
portfolios of tobacco stocks from before and after 1970. I used the same SIC codes to 
construct my portfolio of tobacco stocks as I used in current sin stock analysis. However, 
I created two distinct tobacco portfolios—one with monthly returns from July 31, 1962 to 
March 31, 1970 (Portfolio 1) and one with monthly returns from April 30, 1970 to June 
29, 2018 (Portfolio 2.) I used two capital asset pricing models to compare the 
performance of Portfolio 1 and Portfolio 2—the Fama-French 3 Factor Model and the 
Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum. I couldn’t use the Fama-French 5 Factor 
Model to analyze the performance of the two portfolios because the Fama-French 
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database doesn’t have profitability and investment factors dating back to the beginning of 
monthly returns for Portfolio 1.  
When I ran my linear regression model using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model, 
Portfolio 1 generated a negative monthly alpha (-0.001.) This negative alpha was 
surprising to me—I had yet to see a portfolio of tobacco stocks in my all of my research 
generate a negative alpha coefficient. However, Portfolio 1 generated a t-stat of -0.45 and 
a P > |t| value of 0.654. From this model, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
monthly alpha coefficient is zero with a 95% confidence interval.  
 When I ran my linear regression using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus 
Momentum, Portfolio 1 generated a positive monthly alpha (0.001). I thought it was very 
fascinating to see this monthly become positive using this model, as the monthly alpha 
was negative using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model. Despite producing a positive 
monthly alpha, it generated a t-stat of 0.53 and a P > |t| of 0.597. Like the results I 
attained using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the monthly alpha coefficient is zero with a 95% confidence interval. 
 The results were shocking when I transitioned to running my linear regression 
models on Portfolio 2. Once I ran my linear regression model using the Fama-French 3 
Factor Model, Portfolio 2 generated a positive monthly alpha (0.009.) This positive 
monthly alpha was also statistically significant. It generated a t-stat of 5.09 and a P > |t| 
value of 0.000. These findings allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the monthly 
alpha coefficient is zero with a 95% confidence interval. 
 The results were more shocking when I transitioned to running my linear 
regression model using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum. Portfolio 2 
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generated a positive monthly alpha (0.01.) This positive monthly alpha of 0.01 is 
incredibly large and shows the magnitude of the performance of this portfolio. More 
importantly, this large positive monthly alpha was also statistically significant. It 
generated a t-stat of 5.18 and a P > |t| of 0.000. Once again, these findings allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the monthly alpha coefficient is zero with a 95% 
confidence interval.   
 Based on my data analysis, it is clear to see that Portfolio 2 generated a positive 
and statistically significant monthly alpha across the two capital asset pricing models 
after April 1970. In comparison, Portfolio 1 did produce any meaningful results across 
the two capital asset pricing models. It is clear to see that Portfolio 2 generated 
statistically significant levels of alpha across two factor models while Portfolio 1 did not. 
The results from Portfolio 2 support my hypothesis that portfolios of sin stocks generate 
larger levels of excess returns after they are perceived as sinful by institutions and 
investors.  
 
ii. Alcohol Industry in U.S. Equity Markets 
 
The alcohol industry, one of the other industries in the “triumvirate of sin,” is 
another widely recognized sinful industry by both institutions and investors. Like the 
tobacco industry, countless research has been published exhibiting the adverse health 
effects associated with drinking alcohol, including heart damage, liver damage, and 
pancreas damage. Similarly, drinking alcohol has been studied and linked to numerous 
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kinds of cancer.19 Like tobacco companies, alcohol companies in the U.S. spend hundreds 
of millions of dollars advertising their products across all different mediums. In 2016, 
approximately $1.59B was spent on beer advertising alone in the U.S. 20 Despite the 
adverse health effects associated with drinking alcohol, the alcohol industry continues to 
be one of the most profitable industries in the U.S. Since 2009, total alcoholic beverage 
sales in the U.S. have grown every year, totaling $234.4B in fiscal 2017.21 
In order to compare the performance of the alcohol industry before and after it 
was widely perceived as sinful, I needed to pick a critical point in time in which the 
industry was widely viewed as sinful by both institutions and investors. I believe that the 
Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988 is the critical point in time in which the alcohol 
industry was widely perceived by both institutions and investors. The act required labels 
of alcoholic beverages to carry the following government warning: 
GOVERNMENT WARNING: 
(1) According to the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic 
beverages during pregnancy because of the risk of birth defects. 
(2) Consumption of alcoholic beverages impairs your ability to drive a car or 
operate machinery, and may cause health problems.22 
                                                           
19 “Alcohol’s Effect on the Body,” National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, accessed 
November 23, 2018, https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/alcohols-effects-body. 
20 “Traditional media advertising spending on alcoholic beverages in the United States in 2016, by category 
(in million U.S. dollars), Statista, accessed November 23, 2018, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/748562/alcoholic-beverage-ad-spend-category-us/. 
21“Total alcoholic beverage sales in the United States from 2006 to 2017 (in million U.S. dollars), Statista, 
accessed November 23, 2018, https://www.statista.com/statistics/207936/us-total-alcoholic-beverages-
sales-since-1990/. 
22“S.2047 – Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988,” Congress.Gov., accessed November 25, 2018, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/100th-congress/senate-bill/2047.  
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Similarly, the mission statement of the act stated, “the American public should be 
informed about the health hazards that may result from the consumption or abuse of 
alcoholic beverages, and has determined that it would be beneficial to provide a clear, 
nonconfusing reminder of such hazards, and that there is a need for national uniformity in 
such reminders in order to avoid the promulgation of incorrect or misleading information 
and to minimize burdens on interstate commerce.”23 I believe that this act is the clearest 
example of the alcohol industry being recognized as sinful. The fact that the U.S. 
government mandated all U.S. alcoholic beverages manufactures to list the adverse health 
effects associated with drinking their products exhibits the sinful nature of their products.  
In order to support my hypothesis that portfolios of future sin stocks will generate 
larger—and positive—abnormal returns once they are widely perceived as sinful, I 
compared the performance of portfolios of alcohol stocks from before and after 1988. I 
used the same SIC codes to construct my portfolio of alcohol stocks as I used in current 
sin stock analysis. However, I created two distinct alcohol portfolios—one with monthly 
returns from June 30, 1936 to January 29, 1988 (Portfolio 3) and one with monthly 
returns from February 29, 1988 to June 29, 2018 (Portfolio 4.) I used two capital asset 
pricing models to compare the performance of Portfolio 3 and Portfolio 4—the Fama-
French 3 Factor Model and the Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum. I couldn’t 
use the Fama-French 5 Factor Model to analyze the performance of the two portfolios 
because the Fama-French database doesn’t have profitability and investment factors 
dating back to the beginning of monthly returns for Portfolio 3.  
                                                           
23 “27 U.S. Code § 213 - Declaration of Policy and Purpose | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute,” 
accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/27/213. 
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When I ran my linear regression model using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model, 
Portfolio 3 generated a positive monthly alpha (0.003.) Similarly, Portfolio 3 generated a 
t-stat of 1.65 and a P > |t| value of 0.100. From this model, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the monthly alpha coefficient is zero with a 95% confidence interval. 
When I ran my linear regression using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus 
Momentum, Portfolio 3 generated a positive monthly alpha (0.003). Despite producing a 
positive monthly alpha, it generated a t-stat of 1.79 and a P > |t| of 0.074. Like the results 
I attained using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the monthly alpha coefficient is zero with a 95% confidence interval. 
 When I transitioned to running my linear regression models on Portfolio 4, the 
results were very different. Once I ran my linear regression model using the Fama-French 
3 Factor Model, Portfolio 4 generated a positive monthly alpha (0.007.) This positive 
monthly alpha was also statistically significant. It generated a t-stat of 3.71 and a P > |t| 
value of 0.000. These findings allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the monthly 
alpha coefficient is zero with a 95% confidence interval. 
 The results were even more surprising when I transitioned to running my linear 
regression model using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model plus Momentum. Portfolio 4 
generated a positive monthly alpha (0.008). This positive monthly alpha of 0.008 is very 
large and shows the magnitude of the performance of this portfolio after 1988. More 
importantly, this large positive monthly alpha was also statistically significant. It 
generated a t-stat of 3.81 and a P > |t| of 0.000. Once again, these findings allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the monthly alpha coefficient is zero with a 95% 
confidence interval.   
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 Based on my data analysis, it is clear to see that Portfolio 4 generated a positive 
and statistically significant monthly alpha across the two capital asset pricing models 
after April 1970. In comparison, Portfolio 3 did produce any meaningful results across 
the two capital asset pricing models. It is clear to see that Portfolio 4 generated 
statistically significant levels of alpha across two factor models while Portfolio 3 did not. 
The results from Portfolio 4 support my hypothesis that portfolios of sin stocks generate 
larger levels of excess returns after they are perceived as sinful by institutions and 
investors.  
 
iii. Conclusion from Alcohol and Tobacco Event Studies 
 
In my thesis, I argue that the growth of socially responsible investing practices in 
U.S. equity markets will cause four industries—sugary beverages, fast food/sugary food, 
biotech & pharmaceuticals and tech/social media—to eventually be perceived as sinful 
and grouped with the current sinful industries—alcohol, tobacco, gaming and aerospace 
& defense. Once these industries are widely perceived as sinful by both institutions and 
investors, portfolios of these stocks will generate larger positive abnormal returns after 
being perceived as sinful as compared to before they were perceived as sinful. Since I 
cannot predict the future performance of these industries, I thought that the two event 
studies of alcohol and tobacco would help shine light on what would potentially happen 
to these industries once they are widely perceived as sinful. In both event studies, it was 
clear to see that portfolios of tobacco (Portfolio 2) and alcohol (Portfolio 4) generated 
positive and statistically significant alphas after being recognized sinful as compared to 
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before they were recognized as sinful (Portfolios 1 &3.) These two event studies support 
my argument that portfolios of sin stocks generate larger and positive excess returns after 
they are widely perceived as sinful.  
These two event studies bolster my argument that investing in these future sin stocks 
will be a viable and profitable investment strategy in the immediate and foreseeable 
future. Portfolios of sugary beverages and fast food/sugary food produced a positive and 
statistically significant monthly alpha when regressed on the Fama-French 3 Factor 
Model and the Fama-French 3-Factor Model plus Momentum. Portfolios of biotech & 
pharmaceutical companies and tech/social media companies produced a positive and 
statistically significant alpha when regressed on all three capital asset pricing models I 
use. Since these portfolios generate alpha now, and I have proven that portfolios of sin 
stocks generate larger and statistically significant levels of alpha after their industries are 
widely perceived as sinful, investing in these future sinful industries will be a profitable 
investment strategy in the short and long term horizon. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In my Senior Thesis, I wanted to explore how the growth of socially responsible 
investing practices in U.S. equity markets would impact sin stock performance. Similarly, 
I wanted to explore the performance of portfolios of sin stocks, as there has been 
conflicting literature about the existence of the sin stock anomaly. I also wanted to 
examine the performance of socially responsible ETFs to see if investing in socially 
responsible investment vehicles would generate some positive abnormal return over a 
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common benchmark. Furthermore, I hypothesized that as socially responsible investing 
practices in U.S. equity markets continue to grow, there were going to be more industries 
that are going to be perceived as sinful by both institutions and investors. I believe that 
eventually the sugary beverages industry, fast food/sugary food industry, biotech & 
pharmaceutical industry and the tech/social media industry will all be recognized as 
sinful. If I could prove to some degree the sin stock anomaly existed, a profitable 
investment strategy of investing in these future sin stocks would be profitable and viable 
in both the short and long term time horizon. 
In my analysis of socially responsible ETFs, I wanted to see the performance of these 
ETFs and examine if any abnormal returns were generated from investing in them. Based 
on my findings, only one socially responsible ETF (CRBN) generated a positive and 
statistically significant alpha. However, this ETF was the newest ETF to be constructed 
out of my sample and its performance is explained by Dan Weil’s (2018) WSJ article 
showing a positive correlation between the ETFs’ months since inception and the positive 
excess return generated. Most of the socially responsible ETFs did not generate any 
meaningful nor statistically significant alpha across all factor models. Furthermore, two 
of my socially responsible ETFs produced a statistically significant but negative alpha—
implying that these ETFs had generated negative returns since their inception. From this 
data analysis, I conclude that it is essentially meaningless to invest in these socially 
responsible securities—investors are better off investing in a market ETF and until these 
ETFs can consistently beat the market, these ETFs should be avoided. 
In my analysis of current sin stocks, I wanted to see if I could prove the existence of 
the sin stock anomaly. I created equal-weighted portfolios of current sin stocks based on 
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SIC codes and used existing capital asset pricing models to see if they generated alpha. 
Every single equal-weighted portfolio of current sin stocks generated a positive and 
statistically significant monthly alpha across all factor models (except for gaming with 
the Fama-French 5 Factor Model). Virtually every single equal-weighted portfolio of 
current sin stocks generated a positive and statistically significant monthly alpha across 
all factor models. I believe that these findings prove the existence of the sin stock 
anomaly. 
In my analysis of what I believe to be future sin stocks, I aimed at exploring the 
performance of these industries before they were widely perceived as sinful. Across all 
factor models, equal-weighted portfolios of biotech & pharmaceutical stocks and 
tech/social media stocks generated a positive and statistically significant monthly alpha 
coefficient. Equal-weighted portfolios of sugary beverage stocks and fast food/sugary 
food stocks exhibited a positive and statistically significant monthly alpha across all 
factor models except the Fama-French 5 Factor Model. The results from my analysis of 
future sin stocks reveal that equal-weighted portfolios of these future sin stocks, in almost 
all instances, have generated some form of positive and statistically significant alpha in 
the past. These results, paired along with the evidence of the sin stock anomaly, showcase 
a viable and profitable investment strategy in the short and long term time horizon. 
Finally, I wanted to see how equal-weighted portfolios of current sinful industries—
alcohol and tobacco—performed before and after they were widely perceived as sinful. I 
used the same portfolio construction and factor models in my current and future sin stock 
analysis. The goal of these event studies was to further bolster my argument that 
investing in these future sin stocks will be a profitable investment strategy in the short 
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and long term time horizon. By choosing a critical point in time in which I believe these 
industries were widely perceived as sinful, I then compared their performance before and 
after the event. In both event studies, and across all factor models used, equal-weighted 
portfolios of alcohol and tobacco stocks showed a positive and statistically significant 
alpha after they were perceived as sinful, as compared to before they were perceived as 
sinful. These findings support my central hypothesis to my paper and ultimately connect 
the two distinct topics of my study—socially responsible investing and investing in sin 
stocks. 
These two distinct areas of portfolio management are fascinating because both 
incorporate ideas that are not normally associated with portfolio management theory—
including social norms, ethical constraints and moral constraints. These two areas of 
portfolio management are a hot-topic issue. Both ask the question, why should I care 
about what I invest in? This question then brings up the idea that you either benefit from 
investing a certain way, or you become impaired from investing a certain way. Based on 
my analysis, investors benefit from investing in sin stocks. Portfolios of these stocks have 
generated positive and statistically significant monthly alpha when regressed on 
numerous factor models. On the other hand, investors seem to be impaired by investing in 
socially responsible ETFs as most have not beat the market since their inception. Despite 
the impairment that arises due to socially responsible investing, it has continuously 
grown in U.S. equity markets over the past 15 years. Similarly, despite the benefit of 
investing in sin stocks, it has become increasingly taboo to invest in these companies. 
These two monumental trends create an instrumental question that needs to be addressed: 
how will the growth of socially responsible investing affect sin stocks going forward in 
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U.S. equity markets? Based on my results, the answer is clear—once these industries are 
perceived as sinful in U.S. equity markets, portfolios of these stocks will generate larger, 
positive, and statistically significant levels of alpha than before their industries were 
perceived as sinful. I am not advocating for investing in morally or ethically hazardous 
industries. What I will say is that each investor needs to decide how far their moral and 
ethical values will affect their investment choices and their portfolio construction. 
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Figure 1: Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investing 
Growth in the United States from 1995-2016 
Source: https://www.ussif.org/files/SIF_Trends_16_Executive_Summary(1).pdf 
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Figure 2: Total Returns of My Socially Responsible ETFs 
and Comparables since Their Inceptions 
 
Ticker  Inception Date  Total Return* Since 
Inception 
DSI November 14, 2006 8.11% 
SUSA January 24, 2005 8.27% 
CRBN December 8, 2014 8.16% 
EQLT February 24, 2014 10.91% 
QCLN February 8, 2007 0.34% 
VICEX September 30, 2002 9.69%** 
S&P 500 TR January 4, 1988 12.71%*** 
 
*Total Return represents changes to NAV and accounts for distributions from the funds 
** https://usamutuals.com/vice-fund/ 
*** https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5ESP500TR/history?p=%5ESP500TR 
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DSI 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .969 .040 23.83 0.000 .889 1.05 
SMB -.072 .030 -2.35 0.020 -.133 -.011 
HML .034 .060 0.57 0.571 -.0856 .154 
Alpha .0008 .001 0.79 0.429 -.001 .002 
 
DSI 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .968 .039 24.23 0.000 .889 1.04 
SMB -.072 .030 -2.34 0.021 -.133 -.011 
HML .031 .063 0.50 0.616 -.093 .157 
UMD -.003 .019 -0.21 0.837 -.041 .033 
Alpha .0008 .001 0.80 0.427 -.002 .002 
 
DSI 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .981 .037 25.98 0.000 .907 1.05 
SMB -.063 .033 -1.89 0.061 -.129 .002 
HML .023 .057 0.41 0.686 -.089 .136 
CMA .065 .082 0.79 0.430 -.098 .229 
RMW .068 .062 1.11 0.270 -.053 .191 
Alpha .0005 .001 0.51 0.610 -.001 .002 
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SUSA 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .993 .018 52.80 0.000 .956 1.03 
SMB -.106 .027 -3.85 0.000 -.160 -.051 
HML -.037 .025 -1.45 0.150 -.087 .013 
Alpha -.001 .000 -1.68 0.096 -.002 .0001 
 
SUSA 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .988 .019 50.54 0.000 .950 1.02 
SMB -.102 .027 -3.85 0.000 -.159 -.051 
HML -.048 .027 -1.78 0.078 -.102 .005 
UMD -.010 .012 -1.46 0.145 -.043 .006 
Alpha -.001 .0006 -1.61 0.110 -.002 .0002 
 
SUSA 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.00 .018 53.27 0.000 .966 1.04 
SMB -.096 .026 -3.61 0.000 -.148 -.043 
HML -.040 .031 -1.28 0.203 -.102 .021 
CMA .042 .054 0.79 0.428 -.062 .147 
RMW .070 .047 1.50 0.136 -.022 .163 
Alpha -.001 .0006 -2.01 0.046 -.002 -.00002 
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QCLN 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.56 .114 13.68 0.000 1.34 1.79 
SMB .591 .176 3.35 0.001 .242 .941 
HML -.475 .170 -2.78 0.006 -.813 -.137 
Alpha -.008 .004 -1.94 0.0054 -.017 .0001 
 
QCLN 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.55 .124 12.50 0.000 1.30 1.80 
SMB .591 .175 3.36 0.001 .243 .939 
HML -.504 .166 -3.03 0.003 -.833 -.174 
UMD -.043 .102 -0.42 0.675 -.245 .159 
Alpha -.008 .004 -1.92 0.058 -.017 .0002 
 
QCLN 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.410 .113 12.43 0.000 1.18 1.63 
SMB .613 .186 3.29 0.001 .245 .981 
HML -.062 .202 -0.30 0.762 -.470 .345 
CMA -1.16 .284 -4.10 0.000 -1.72 -.602 
RMW -.149 .294 -0.51 0.612 -.731 .432 
Alpha -.006 .004 -1.45 0.149 -.015 .002 
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CRBN 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market -.120 .175 -0.69 0.497 -.475 .234 
SMB .101 .191 0.53 0.600 -.286 .488 
HML .129 .166 0.78 0.440 -.206 .466 
Alpha .008 .005 1.40 0.168 -.004 .201 
 
CRBN 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market -.182 .205 -0.89 0.380 -.599 .233 
SMB .078 .181 0.43 0.668 -.289 .446 
HML .016 .181 0.09 0.929 -.351 .384 
UMD -.172 .198 -0.87 0.392 -.574 .230 
Alpha .009 .006 1.52 0.138 -.003 .021 
 
CRBN 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market -.012 .186 -0.07 0.948 -.390 .366 
SMB .367 .201 1.82 0.076 -.040 .775 
HML .170 .250 0.68 0.500 -.336 .677 
CMA .453 .396 1.15 0.259 -.348 1.25 
RMW 1.12 .420 2.68 0.011 .275 1.98 
Alpha .008 .005 1.44 0.158 -.003 .019 
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EQLT 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .985 .070 13.98 0.000 .843 1.12 
SMB .079 .075 1.06 0.296 -.072 .231 
HML .044 .088 0.51 0.616 -.132 .222 
Alpha .0004 .002 0.20 0.843 -.004 .005 
 
EQLT 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .934 .082 11.26 0.000 .767 1.10 
SMB .076 .079 0.96 0.341 -.083 .235 
HML -.064 .114 -0.56 0.578 -.294 .166 
UMD -.157 .082 -1.91 0.062 -.322 .007 
Alpha .001 .002 0.48 0.633 -.003 .005 
 
EQLT 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.00 .068 14.62 0.000 .867 1.14 
SMB .114 .081 1.40 0.167 -.049 .278 
HML -.006 .141 -0.04 0.966 -.291 .279 
CMA .181 .267 0.68 0.501 -.357 .720 
RMW .130 .147 0.89 0.379 -.166 .427 
Alpha .0004 .002 0.20 0.844 -.004 .005 
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VICEX 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .917 .065 14.03 0.000 .788 1.04 
SMB -.138 .091 -1.51 0.132 -.317 .041 
HML -.210 .113 -1.86 0.065 -.434 .013 
Alpha .002 .002 0.97 0.332 -.002 .006 
 
VICEX 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .934 .059 15.79 0.000 .817 1.05 
SMB -.143 .089 -1.59 0.112 -.320 .034 
HML -.188 .123 -1.53 0.128 -.432 .054 
UMD .045 .057 0.79 0.432 -.068 .159 
Alpha .002 .002 0.93 0.355 -.002 .006 
 
VICEX 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .928 .055 16.69 0.000 .818 1.03 
SMB -.107 .106 -1.01 0.316 -.318 .103 
HML -.148 .131 -1.13 0.260 -.408 .111 
CMA -.150 .166 -0.91 0.366 -.479 .177 
RMW .166 .162 1.02 0.308 -.154 .486 
Alpha .001 .002 0.71 0.481 -.002 .006 
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Alcohol  
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .866 .050 17.11 0.000 .766 .965 
SMB .152 .077 1.97 0.050 .0008 .305 
HML .378 .082 4.57 0.000 .215 .541 
Alpha .006 .001 4.01 0.000 .003 .010 
 
Alcohol 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .858 .046 18.30 0.000 .766 .951 
SMB .155 .076 2.03 0.043 .005 .306 
HML .362 .074 4.90 0.000 .217 .508 
UMD -.039 .081 -0.49 0.624 -.200 .120 
Alpha .007 .001 3.85 0.000 .003 .010 
 
Alcohol 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .867 .067 12.88 0.000 .735 1.00 
SMB .139 .085 1.63 0.104 -.028 .307 
HML .353 .139 2.54 0.012 .079 .627 
CMA .049 .141 0.35 0.729 -.228 .327 
RMW .380 .122 3.10 0.002 .139 .622 
Alpha .005 .002 2.63 0.009 .001 .009 
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Tobacco 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .745 .057 12.87 0.000 .631 .859 
SMB .009 .088 0.11 0.912 -.163 .183 
HML .251 .101 2.49 0.013 .052 .449 
Alpha .010 .002 4.97 0.000 .006 .014 
 
Tobacco 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .733 .058 12.50 0.000 .618 .849 
SMB .014 .087 0.17 0.863 -.155 .185 
HML .226 .108 2.09 0.037 .013 .440 
UMD -.061 .068 -0.90 0.371 -.195 .073 
Alpha .011 .002 4.95 0.000 .006 .015 
 
Tobacco 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .835 .084 9.92 0.000 .670 1.00 
SMB .137 .111 1.23 0.218 -.081 .356 
HML .019 .159 0.12 0.905 -.295 .333 
CMA .344 .193 1.78 0.076 -.035 .723 
RMW .548 .162 3.38 0.001 .228 .867 
Alpha .006 .002 2.12 0.035 .0004 .011 
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Gaming  
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.08 .062 17.36 0.000 .960 1.20 
SMB .745 .100 7.40 0.000 .547 .942 
HML .635 .106 5.99 0.000 .426 .843 
Alpha .004 .001 2.85 0.004 .001 .008 
 
Gaming 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.03 .045 22.77 0.000 .944 1.12 
SMB .767 .086 8.87 0.000 .597 .937 
HML .531 .078 6.76 0.000 .376 .685 
UMD -.262 .097 -2.70 0.007 -.453 -.071 
Alpha .006 .001 3.60 0.000 .003 .010 
 
Gaming 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.15 .076 15.09 0.000 1.00 1.30 
SMB .729 .100 7.23 0.000 .531 .928 
HML .801 .171 4.67 0.000 .463 1.13 
CMA -.251 .157 -1.60 0.110 -.561 .057 
RMW .449 .138 3.24 0.001 .176 .722 
Alpha .001 .001 0.54 0.589 -.002 .005 
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Aerospace & Defense 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.16 .047 24.66 0.000 1.07 1.25 
SMB .807 .113 7.09 0.000 .583 1.03 
HML -.027 .086 -0.32 0.751 -.197 .142 
Alpha .006 .001 4.27 0.000 .003 .010 
 
Aerospace & Defense 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.11 .048 23.20 0.000 1.02 1.21 
SMB .827 .103 7.99 0.000 .623 1.03 
HML -.118 .088 -1.35 0.179 -.292 .054 
UMD -.230 .068 -3.35 0.001 -.366 -.095 
Alpha .008 .001 5.01 0.000 .005 .012 
 
Aerospace & Defense  
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .993 .070 14.08 0.000 .854 1.13 
SMB .595 .108 5.50 0.000 .382 .808 
HML .386 .152 2.54 0.012 .087 .686 
CMA -.608 .212 -2.86 0.005 -1.02 -.189 
RMW -.278 .152 -1.82 0.069 -.579 .022 
Alpha .009 .002 3.96 0.000 .004 .013 
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Soda/Sugary Beverages 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .912 .063 14.37 0.000 .788 1.03 
SMB .585 .096 6.09 0.000 .396 .774 
HML .415 .110 3.76 0.000 .198 .633 
Alpha .003 .001 2.01 0.045 .00006 .006 
 
Soda/Sugary Beverages 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .870 .047 18.53 0.000 .778 .963 
SMB .604 .087 6.87 0.000 .431 .776 
HML .327 .080 4.08 0.000 .169 .485 
UMD -.222 .117 -1.89 0.060 -.454 .008 
Alpha .004 .001 2.50 0.013 .001 .008 
 
Soda/Sugary Beverages  
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .943 .078 11.96 0.000 .788 1.09 
SMB .640 .109 5.86 0.000 .425 .856 
HML .543 .180 3.02 0.003 .188 .898 
CMA -.127 .142 -0.89 0.375 -.408 .154 
RMW .561 .134 4.16 0.000 .295 .826 
Alpha .0008 .001 0.43 0.670 -.002 0.004 
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Fast Food/Sugary Food Companies 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .852 .056 14.98 0.000 .740 .964 
SMB .529 .087 6.06 0.000 .357 .701 
HML .437 .099 4.42 0.000 .242 .631 
Alpha .003 .001 2.22 0.027 .0003 .006 
 
Fast Food/Sugary Food Companies 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .816 .044 18.42 0.000 .729 .903 
SMB .545 .080 6.76 0.000 .386 .704 
HML .362 .073 4.91 0.000 .217 .507 
UMD -.189 .102 -1.84 0.066 -.391 .012 
Alpha .004 .001 2.63 0.009 .001 .008 
 
Fast Food/Sugary Food Companies 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .874 .069 12.52 0.000 .736 1.01 
SMB .618 .096 6.42 0.000 .429 .808 
HML .528 .162 3.26 0.001 .209 .847 
CMA -.073 .135 -0.55 0.586 -.339 .191 
RMW .584 .121 4.83 0.000 .345 .822 
Alpha .0005 .001 0.33 0.744 -.002 .004 
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Biotech & Pharmaceuticals  
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.05 .048 21.92 0.000 .961 1.15 
SMB .708 .072 9.74 0.000 .565 .851 
HML -.108 .086 -1.25 0.211 -.278 .061 
Alpha .008 .001 4.68 0.000 .004 .011 
 
Biotech & Pharmaceuticals  
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.02 .046 21.98 0.000 .934 1.11 
SMB .722 .072 9.97 0.000 .579 .864 
HML -.172 .086 -1.98 0.048 -.343 -.001 
UMD -.161 .059 -2.72 0.007 -.277 -.044 
Alpha .009 .001 5.03 0.000 .005 .013 
 
Biotech & Pharmaceuticals 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.11 .065 16.91 0.000 .986 1.24 
SMB .606 .094 6.40 0.000 .420 .793 
HML -.218 .147 -1.47 0.141 -.509 .072 
CMA .152 .157 0.97 0.333 -.157 .461 
RMW -.280 .130 -2.14 0.033 -.537 -.022 
Alpha .007 .002 2.87 0.004 .002 .012 
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Tech/Social Media 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.13 .058 19.42 0.000 1.02 1.25 
SMB .798 .176 4.52 0.000 .451 1.14 
HML -.221 .111 -2.00 0.047 -.440 -.003 
Alpha .006 .002 3.32 0.001 .002 .010 
 
Tech/Social Media 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market 1.07 .054 19.84 0.000 .967 1.18 
SMB .827 .160 5.15 0.000 .511 1.14 
HML -.356 .102 -3.47 0.001 -.559 -.154 
UMD -.341 .077 -4.43 0.000 -.493 -.190 
Alpha .009 .002 4.46 0.000 .005 .013 
 
Tech/Social Media  
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t|  95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .998 .088 11.27 0.000 .824 1.17 
SMB .630 .183 3.44 0.001 .269 .991 
HML .200 .197 1.02 0.310 -.187 .588 
CMA -.717 .250 -2.87 0.004 -1.21 -.225 
RMW -.201 .203 -0.99 0.323 -.602 .199 
Alpha .007 .003 2.60 0.010 .001 .013 
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TOBACCO CASE STUDY 
Before: 3 Factor Model (Portfolio 1) 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .544 .102 5.32 0.000 .340 .747 
SMB .556 .149 3.72 0.000 .259 .854 
HML .634 .175 3.62 0.000 .285 .989 
Alpha -.001 .003 -0.45 0.654 -.007 .004 
 
Before: 3 Factor Model plus Momentum (Portfolio 1) 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .517 .100 5.16 0.000 .318 .717 
SMB .642 .135 4.75 0.000 .373 .912 
HML .511 .159 3.21 0.002 .194 .827 
UMD -.362 .111 -3.27 0.002 -.583 -.142 
Alpha .001 .003 0.53 0.597 -.004 .007 
 
After: 3 Factor Model (Portfolio 2) 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .766 .054 14.11 0.000 .659 .872 
SMB .306 .100 3.06 0.002 .109 .503 
HML .1023 .084 1.21 0.225 -.063 .267 
Alpha .009 .001 5.09 0.000 .005 .013 
 
After: 3 Factor Model plus Momentum (Portfolio 2) 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .748 .053 14.04 0.000 .643 .853 
SMB .275 .100 2.74 0.006 .077 .472 
HML .099 .081 1.23 0.219 -.059 .259 
UMD -.085 .062 -1.37 0.171 -.208 .037 
Alpha .010 .001 5.18 0.000 .006 .014 
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ALCOHOL CASE STUDY  
Before: 3 Factor Model (Portfolio 3) 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .895 .064 13.99 0.000 .769 1.02 
SMB .660 .095 6.92 0.000 .472 .847 
HML .296 .126 2.34 0.020 .047 .546 
Alpha .003 .001 1.65 0.100 -.0006 .007 
 
Before: 3 Factor Model plus Momentum (Portfolio 3) 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .894 .063 14.20 0.000 .770 1.01 
SMB .654 .091 7.19 0.000 .475 .834 
HML .285 .116 2.45 0.015 .055 .516 
UMD -.039 .080 -0.49 0.623 -.198 .118 
Alpha .003 .002 1.79 0.074 -.003 .007 
 
After: 3 Factor Model (Portfolio 4) 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .801 .062 12.90 0.000 .679 .924 
SMB .042 .079 0.54 0.592 -.113 .198 
HML .407 .095 4.28 0.000 .220 .594 
Alpha .007 .001 3.71 0.000 .003 .011 
 
After: 3 Factor Model plus Momentum (Portfolio 4) 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient  Std. Error t-stat P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Market .763 .053 14.20 0.000 .657 .869 
SMB .049 .070 0.67 0.506 -.097 .197 
HML .364 .080 4.54 0.000 .206 .522 
UMD -.115 .090 -1.28 0.202 -.293 .062 
Alpha .008 .002 3.81 0.000 .003 .012 
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